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SUMMARY
This thesis focuses on developing a comprehensive framework for understanding
the challenges NGOs face with in-kind donations in disaster relief. The overwhelming
problem of inappropriate material donations, often referred to as the second dis-
aster, has plagued disaster relief operations for decades now in both domestic and
international disaster response. Despite efforts to promote “cash only” giving in dis-
aster relief, unsolicited and mostly inappropriate in-kind giving continues to challenge
NGOs in every major disaster. Holguin Vera et al. [118] identify it as one of the most
pressing yet understudied challenges in disaster relief to date.
This thesis is divided into three parts. In the first part, we conduct a multi-
disciplinary literature review from philanthropy, economics, public policy, corporate
philanthropy and corporate social responsibility to understand why donors donate
in-kind and why NGOs accept those donations. We describe the roles of the various
players involved and explain the structure of the distribution channels in-kind dona-
tions follow both in disaster and non-disaster contexts. We then explain the challenges
NGOs and their donors face with in-kind donations in the context of these channels.
We identify systemic issues in the distribution channels and highlight current policies
and practices that contribute to the second disaster.
In the second part of this thesis, we propose a comprehensive framework to help
donors, NGOs and policy makers comprehend the scope of the problem and identify
strategies to address the challenge of unsolicited donations in disaster relief. Our
framework provides a succinct representation of the main issues and players involved
in the process in a format that is simple to work with and easy to understand. It
xi
supports comprehension of the many related issues and can help NGOs and policy
making bodies (e.g., FEMA, NVOAD, USAID) assess current strategies and devise
new approaches and solution strategies.
In the third part of the thesis, we exploit our framework to propose a tiered
strategy consisting of a set of solutions ranging from decision tools to help NGOs
better screen in-kind donation offers to entire new channels for more productive in-
kind giving in disaster relief. Each of these solutions may deter only a small fraction
of the inappropriate flows, but together they can dramatically diminish the problem.
Our proposed NGO decision tools both allow quick screening of donation offers in
disaster relief and provide a framework for strategic management of corporate in-
kind donations in the long term. We also propose a “retail donation model” which
can transform a portion of the current stream of unwanted and unusable in-kind
donations from individuals and community groups into a valuable source of needed
relief supplies through an entirely new donation channel. We document a successful





The number, severity and impact of humanitarian crises worldwide has grown signif-
icantly in the three decades from 1980 to 2010. According to the Center for Research
on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the University of Louvian [2], the av-
erage of 309 disasters per year between 1981 and 1990 rose to 743 in the last decade
(2001 to 2010), a nearly 140% increase. The number of people affected by these events
has also grown from an average of 125 million annually, nearly 2.5% of the world’s
average population at the time, to 233 million during the last decade (2001 to 2010)
or nearly 3.5% of the world’s population. The annual economic damage (expressed
in 2005 dollars) has tripled from $36 billion in the 1980’s to $100 billion in the 2000s.
In response to these growing needs, global humanitarian aid (both for natural
disasters and man-made conflicts) has increased as well. According to a recent report
by Global Humanitarian Assistance [19], international humanitarian aid has nearly
doubled in the last 10 years, from $6.7 billion in 2000 (or $8.57 billion in 2010 dollars)
to an estimated $16.7 billion in 2010. Most donations are given in the form of cash
grants, but a significant fraction is donated “in-kind”, either in the form of goods,
e.g., donations of food, tents, blankets, medicine, etc., or in the form of services such
as volunteering and various types of pro-bono services. According to the Financial
Tracking Service (FTS)1 of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UNOCHA) [1], nearly 17% (by value) of all reported humanitarian aid from
1The Financial Tracking Service (FTS) is a global, real-time database which records all reported
international humanitarian aid. However, it is not comprehensive as reporting is voluntary.
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2000 to 2010 was donated in-kind.2
A significant portion of humanitarian aid activities involves some type of logis-
tics and aid organizations face severe challenges in this area. Since the 2004 Asian
Tsunami, a large number of research papers have addressed various challenges of hu-
manitarian logistics and many of them (e.g., see [192, 133, 120, 45, 183, 85]) point to
unsolicited material donations as a major source of these challenges. These unsolicited
and often inappropriate material donations can cause significant delays in customs
clearance (in international disasters), occupy already scarce storage and transporta-
tion capacities and consume valuable staff time and money to manage. During the
2004 Asian Tsunami response for example, mountains of unusable donations piled
up at Sri Lanka’s Colombo international airport and nearby relief warehouses nearly
blocking incoming relief supplies and the aircraft that delivered them drained the
airport’s limited fuel supplies [183].
Inappropriate donations are also a challenge for domestic disaster response. In the
first two weeks after hurricane Katrina, for example, trucks dumped used clothing
and other donated household items in relief staging areas and shelter parking lots
without any coordination with the relief workers [120]. This is a common experience
for relief organizations in nearly every major disaster in the U.S. (see for example
[116, 162, 96] for news reports on unsolicited donations). This phenomenon is so
common and painful that relief agencies have dubbed it “the second disaster” . In
two separate humanitarian logistics research papers, Holguin et al. [117, 118] identify
this phenomenon as one of the most under studied but important research areas
in post disaster humanitarian logistics. In this thesis we use the word “disaster”
primarily to refer to large scale sudden on-set natural disasters such as earthquakes,
tsunamis, storms, cyclones, etc. In most cases, these types of catastrophic events
2The actual percentage of in-kind donations is larger since FTS reporting is voluntary and many
private in-kind donations either are not reported in the FTS database or are reported without any
attributed value.
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gather more unsolicited material donations and are followed by second disasters from
logistics challenges.
To understand the sources and operational challenges of in-kind donations, we
examine the scope and practices of in-kind donation in the United States, the largest
in-kind donor country in the world. We explore in-kind donation to both domestic and
international NGOs. Although the missions and operating environments of domestic
and international NGOs differ significantly, they often solicit donations from similar
donor groups and face similar challenges albeit with different magnitudes depending
on the scope, size and location of the response.
In this thesis, we focus on in-kind donations to NGOs from private donors, i.e.,
corporations, individuals and community groups. A large portion of corporate giving
in the U.S. is donated in kind to NGOs and in-kind giving is growing both in size and
as percentage of total giving. According to an estimate by the Center Encouraging
Corporate Philanthropy (CECP)3 [30], corporate in-kind donations account for more
than 95% of the total aggregate giving increase (by CECP survey participants) from
2007 to 2012. Developing a comprehensive understanding of donor motivations for
giving in-kind and the challenges NGOs face in managing in-kind donations is critical
for addressing the problem and building effective partnerships to address it.
Although the challenges of managing in-kind donations are more visible in disaster
response, in-kind donations are difficult to manage even in non-disaster contexts.
The majority of in-kind donations actually go to various long term development
projects. In order to understand the causes of the second disaster, it is important to
understand not only the sources of in-kind donations in disaster relief but also their
supply and distribution channels in non-disaster contexts. We know of no literature
in humanitarian logistics, non-profit management or philanthropy that describes the
3CECP is a CEO membership non-profit organization that promote corporate philanthropy. Its
members include 60 of the largest 100 companies in the FORTUNE 500.
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sources and distribution channels of donated goods. To our knowledge this research
provides the first in-depth study of the sources, challenges and channels of in-kind
donations in the U.S..
We present a systematic view of the mechanisms that lead to the second disaster.
More importantly, we propose a comprehensive framework for guiding NGOs and
government agencies (e.g., USAID, FEMA) in the development of effective remedies
for the second disaster. Based on this systematic description of the problem and
leveraging our comprehensive framework, we propose a structured strategy and several
specific initiatives. Sections 1.2 – 1.4 define the size and scope of our problem. We
summarize the contributions of this thesis in the field of humanitarian logistics and
non-profit management in Section 1.5.
1.2 Scope and size of in-kind giving in the U.S.
To define the scope of our research more specifically, we establish definitions of in-kind
donation and NGO as follows:
1.2.1 Definition of in-kind donation and NGO
Athough in-kind donations are mostly given in the form of goods or services, in-kind
donations also encompass donations of properties, stocks, bonds and other financial
assets. In this thesis we focus on those in-kind donations that cannot be easily con-
verted to cash. Relatively liquid financial assets are fundamentally different in their
characteristics and can be treated as cash donations. Most often beneficiaries use
donations of relatively liquid financial assets by employing the cash generated from
their sale. We exclude such financial assets from our discussion of in-kind donations
and define in-kind donations to be donations of goods or services for charitable pur-
poses. In the non-profit world, these donations are also known as Gifts-in-Kind or
“GIK”.
For the purposes of this thesis, we adopt the World Bank’s terminology for NGOs
4
(see [199] for other definitions) with some modifications. The World Bank defines
NGO [10] as follows:
NGOs include a wide variety of groups and institutions that are entirely
or largely independent of government, and characterized primarily by hu-
manitarian or cooperative, rather than commercial objectives ... that
pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor,
protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake com-
munity development.
We further restrict the use of “NGO” to refer to organizations that provide some
level of direct service to beneficiaries or other NGOs such as providing food, shelter,
medical services, etc. Our definition excludes non-profit organizations such as uni-
versities, museums, environmental and other policy advocacy groups that promote
various social and global issues without providing direct basic services.
1.2.2 Estimated size of annual in-kind giving in the U.S.
To understand the size and scope of in-kind donations to NGOs in the U.S., we
estimate the value of in-kind donations made by various types of donors. One of
the primary challenges in estimating the value of in-kind donations is the valuation
process itself. The IRS [12] suggests using “Fair Market Value” to estimate the
value of in-kind donations, but these valuations are subjective. Depending upon the
valuation process the “Fair Market Value” of an in-kind donation could be its retail
value, wholesale value, cost to produce or some other value.
Because of the subjectivities around the valuation of donated goods and services,
any estimate of the total value of in-kind donations to NGOs is questionable. However,
a reasonable estimate can be used to develop an understanding the level of and trends
in in-kind donations.
We categorize in-kind donors among three types:
5
1. Individual and small group donors,
2. Companies and
3. Government agencies
Based on various data sources, U.S. donors (individuals, businesses and the govern-
ment) contribute roughly $58 billion in-kind to domestic and international NGOs
every year. Nearly 68% of the total $58 billion in-kind donation comes from indi-
vidual volunteering4, mostly to local NGOs (see [17] for detailed volunteering data).
The remaining $18 billion is donated in the form of goods (see Table 1 for giving
by donor type). The majority of these donated products supports various domestic
social causes such as fighting domestic hunger, job training for unemployed people,
or supporting rehabilitation centers, etc. The rest goes to various international relief
and development programs.
1.2.2.1 Individual and small group in-kind giving
Individuals and community groups contribute the largest share of in-kind donations.
They donate products such as canned or packaged food, books, clothing or school
supplies to local non-profits through various in-kind fund raising events. Most of
the donated materials are distributed directly to individuals and families in need
within the U.S. and internationally. By our estimate, based on the IRS report [138],
individual tax payers donate nearly $12 billion each year in the form of donations of
used clothing and household items (see Figure 6). NGOs generate cash by reselling
donated products through thrift stores. According to an estimate by National Resale
Professionals [148], there are over 25,000 thrift stores in the United States, many of
which are run by various local or national charities. For example, Goodwill Industries
4We only considered volunteering hours that are related to direct services such as food preparation
and distribution etc. We have not considered volunteering hours spent for in-direct services such as
fundraising.
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Table 1: Estimated annual in-kind donations to NGOs from various donor groups in
the U.S. (based on 2010 estimate)
Donor Donation type Estimated value
(billions USD) in
2010
Methods used and sources
Individuals Volunteering 40 Estimated conservatively at 23.5 %
of total volunteering hours (valued
at $173 billion) that are spent on
preparing and serving food [25]
Individuals In-kind goods 12 Individual donations of clothing,
household items and electronics




4.1 Estimated as 48% of total in-kind
giving by companies, which repre-
sents companies’ giving in disaster
relief (4%), Health and Social Ser-
vices (30%) and Community and
Economic Development (14%) [30]
Government In-kind goods 1.9 Estimated value of U.S. Government
donations of food for internatoinal
aid under Food for Peace, Title II
program [24]
runs over 2500 thrift stores in the U.S., which generate over $2 billion in annual
revenue. Most of the money generated from these stores is used to support various
job training and job placement services.
Individual in-kind contributions in the form of volunteering dwarfs the value of
contributed goods. Individuals volunteer a total of 1.8 billion hours annually to
NGOs. Valued at $40 billion, this is nearly equivalent to a full time workforce of
1 million or about half the size of Walmart’s global workforce (based on WalMart’s
corporate fact sheet, see [195]). Volunteers practically run the day-to-day operations
of many smaller NGOs in the U.S..
7
Figure 1: Individual donors’ in-kind giving in the U.S.
1.2.2.2 Corporate in-kind giving
Companies, from small local businesses to large multi-national corporations, also do-
nate products and services to NGOs. According to our estimate, the majority of
corporate donations (nearly 60% to 70% of total donations by value) is donated in-
kind in the U.S.. Most corporate product donations are new products often from
surplus inventories. We have not found any comprehensive data source that esti-
mates total corporate in-kind donations to NGOs. The most widely used measure for
philanthropic contributions, Giving USA [21], does not report in-kind gifts separately.
Our estimate is based on the 2006 Business Week survey of S&P 500 companies [62]
and the Corporations Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy (CECP) report [30] of
corporate donations by member corporations. Both sources estimate in-kind dona-
tions at over 60% of total donations. CECP, a CEO membership organization that
8
includes 61 of the Fortune 100 companies, reported [30] $10.46 billion in non-cash
giving out of a total $15.27 billion donated by 96 companies in 2012. This is nearly
70% higher than 2007 non-cash giving of $6.16 billion by these companies (of a total
$10.79 billion).
Figure 2: Corporate in-kind giving in the U.S.
Today’s corporate executives struggle to find an appropriate balance between stock
holders’ demands for higher quarterly profits and other stakeholders’ demands for
companies to play a greater role in addressing social ills. Corporate philanthropy is
shifting away from “check writing” and moving toward more business driven giving,
which often involves engaging non-cash resources for philanthropic initiatives. Many
9
companies have shifted donations toward in-kind giving over the years to manage
both shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ expectations.
The most prominent forms of corporate in-kind donations are product donations,
pro-bono services and employee volunteering. Employee volunteering is generally
reported in terms of time rather than value and is not included in the CECP estimate
of $10.46 billion non-cash donations in 2012. Many of these donations are made to
educational institutions, museums and other organizations, which do not fall within
our definition of NGOs. We only consider corporate donations made to health and
social services, disaster relief and community development projects, which account
for roughly 48% of all donations made by CECP member corporations. This yields a
conservative estimate of $4.1 billion in annual corporate in-kind donations to NGOs.
Based on 2012 CECP data, this donation is about $4.6 billion.
1.2.2.3 Government in-kind giving
The United States government is in fact the largest in-kind donor to international
relief and development programs in the world. USAID’s Title II Food For Peace pro-
gram, for example, has distributed over 106 million metric tons of commodities for
international relief and development to over 100 countries since 1954 [11, 16]. The
U.S. government also donates other in-kind relief supplies such as tents, plastic sheet-
ing, blankets, etc. to support relief efforts in international disasters. In fiscal year 2010
(between October 1, 2009 to September 30, 2010), USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA) distributed nearly $27 million worth of in-kind relief commodi-
ties in response to 73 disaster incidences internationally [23]. We estimate that the
U.S. government donates nearly $2 billion worth of in-kind donations (mostly food
commodities) every year for emergency relief and other development projects inter-
nationally. We do not include in this estimate government domestic food assistance
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programs such as SNAP (formerly known as the food stamp program), WIC, Na-
tional School Lunch Program and others. According to a USDA report [32], the U.S.
government spent over $100 billion in FY 2011 for these programs. We have not in-
cluded these programs in our estimate as these are different in nature – they primarily
transfer “restricted cash” instead of physical goods to beneficiaries.
Along with food and other relief supplies, the U.S. and other countries also send
civil and military assets and people to participate in rescue operations after large scale
international disasters such as the 2004 Asian Tsunami or the 2010 Haiti Earthquake.
One day after the Haiti earthquake, for example, the 1st Special Operations Wing
of the U.S. Air Force re-opened Haiti’s Toussaint L’Ouverture International Airport,
while the U.S. Coast Guard vessel Higgins and U.S. military aircraft began delivering
relief supplies and evacuating American citizens [82]. According to the FTS database
[1], the U.S. government donated $464 million through the Department of Defense
(DoD) in support of humanitarian efforts in Haiti in 2010. Government in-kind do-
nations are diverse in nature and often provide the most timely and critical resources
in emergencies.
1.3 In-kind donations in disaster response
After a large disaster, donors often contribute in-kind (mostly products) to relief
operations in an effort to help disaster victims. People donate canned food, used
clothing and other household items to disaster victims through various NGOs that
participate in relief operations. Many companies and governments also donate relief
supplies to the emergency response.
Appropriate in-kind donations in the time of disaster response can save thousands
of lives. For example, after January 12th, 2010 devastating earthquake in Haiti,
many hospitals and medical equipment manufacturers immediately donated surgical
equipment and supplies to various NGOs providing medical services, saving thousands
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of victims from loosing limbs or even lives in many cases.
Most NGOs struggle with limited availability of funds in the early days of the
response as most of their money is tied to specific projects. It takes several weeks to
get funding from large government and private sector donors after submitting funding
requests based on initial assessment reports. As a result, most NGOs generally have
to fund themselves in the critical first few weeks after a disaster.
Appropriate in-kind donations in the initial stages of response can help NGOs
stretch their limited funds to help more victims. Finding the few appropriate do-
nations among the vast sea of inappropriate offers, however, is a frustrating and
time-consuming exercise for NGO staff that are already hard pressed in emergency
situations.
Many NGOs find themselves in a dilemma: whether to continue throwing limited
human resources at sifting through in-kind offers in the hope of finding appropriate
donations or to completely avoid in-kind donations and focus their limited manpower
on purchasing required supplies with the limited cash available.
Over the last 20 to 30 years the problem has exploded: there are more disasters
affecting more people and receiving more media attention. The NGO community
responding to these disasters has become larger and more fragmented, the number
of donors has increased and they are increasingly donating in-kind. As a result, the
NGO community is drowning in a flood of in-kind donations while disaster victims
continue to thirst for relief.
Even when NGOs do accept donated supplies, moving them is a challenge. Most
donors are not willing to pay for transportation. They expect the recipient NGO
to pick up the goods – generally on relatively short notice – and manage and pay
for their transport, storage and distribution. NGOs must decide between paying to
transport donated goods that may not match their needs perfectly and purchasing
more suitable but also more expensive supplies in the open market. This decision is
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complicated by the realization that purchasing supplies locally offers the secondary
benefit of supporting the local economy, one of strongest arguments against importing
in-kind donations from outside the country in international disaster response, which
can potentially destroy the local market for specific commodities. On the other hand,
large scale disasters can reduce the availability of key relief items and drive their local
prices to unaffordable levels.
1.4 In-kind donation model (non-disaster context)
Despite all these challenges, some NGOs have developed effective programs around
in-kind donations. Feeding America, for example, successfully uses in-kind food do-
nations to address domestic hunger in the U.S. Its network of nearly 200 food banks
across the U.S. collects, sorts and distributes donated food to millions of Americans
every day through food pantries, soup kitchens and other community organizations.
In 2010, Feeding America’s food bank network, the largest hunger relief charity net-
work in the U.S., distributed over 3 billion pounds of food to over 37 million people
[18].
Feeding America has built relationships with national grocery retailers and food
manufacturers who donate a steady flow of food commodities supplemented by gov-
ernment donations, community food drives and the food banks’ own purchases. The
organization has successfully aligned its philanthropic objectives with the business
interests of its donors and built an appropriate logistics infrastructure to overcome
operating challenges in the delivery process. Unfortunately, for many NGOs in-kind
donation programs are not well structured and often cause severe operational chal-
lenges. Most will agree that there is enormous opportunity for improvement.
Corporations are increasingly interested in achieving higher social and business
impacts with their philanthropic contributions. They are looking for ways to leverage
their unique capabilities and resources to address social problems that are strategically
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important to them [13].
Porter et al. [156] claim that corporate philanthropy made in a strategic manner
can improve the business context and hence the company’s long term competitive-
ness. Most successful examples of strategic philanthropy they cite involve donation
of employee time, products or technologies such as IBM’s Reinventing Education,
Cisco’s Networking Academy or Pfizer’s Zithromax R© donation program for fighting
blinding Trachoma globally.
1.5 Research contributions
Despite the growing importance of in-kind giving to NGOs, we know of no compre-
hensive research that documents its sources, motivations, the parties involved in the
distribution process and the forces that shape these transactions. Although much of
the humanitarian logistics literature has identified unsolicited product donations as
one of the main challenges in effective logistics coordination and operations in disas-
ter relief, that work have not gone on to investigate the sources and pathways and
suggest specific initiatives for addressing them. This thesis provides, to the best of
our knowledge, the first comprehensive study of in-kind donations to NGOs.
This study provides a better understanding of the challenges in today’s in-kind
donation practices to NGO professionals and donors. This research can help decision
makers in NGOs, donor organizations and policy making bodies (government agencies
including USAID, FEMA, IRS) be more strategic about their initiatives and policy
recommendations with respect to in-kind giving. We believe without such comprehen-
sive understanding, in-kind donations will remain a largely adhoc and opportunistic
resource stream for most NGOs, creating systemic challenges for NGO operations,
especially in the time of disaster relief.
Individuals contributing their time, personal items and even purchased supplies
are an important and growing source of in-kind donations to NGOs. This is also
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the most problematic source in disaster relief. Over the years, NGOs have tried to
convince donors to contribute only cash in an effort to reduce the impact of the second
disaster. AidMatrix introduced its donation portal (in 2007) to help NGOs and donors
better communicate their needs and their offers. Unfortunately, unsolicited in-kind
donations continue to be a major problem for disaster relief NGOs in the U.S.. These
approaches are not sufficient on their own to change current in-kind giving practices
in disaster relief. We propose a comprehensive solution framework addressing the
motivations, relationships and transactions of the entities involved in in-kind giving.
This framework can help NGOs and policy makers address the problem in a more
systematic and effective way.
Nearly every seasoned NGO practitioner has a personal horror story involving
corporate in-kind donations and many would prefer not to deal with in-kind donations
at all. But in-kind donations represent the fastest growing segment of philanthropic
giving especially from corporate donors and the reality is that NGOs must learn to
manage them effectively. This thesis proposes a decision framework and tool to help
NGOs strategically manage corporate in-kind donations.
This thesis not only explores and explains the current practices of in-kind do-
nations, but also proposes alternative engagement models that allow NGOs to tap
donor motivations more effectively and productively. We offer a conceptual “retail
donation model”, which can align individual donors’, corporate donors’ and NGOs’
motivations and create a productive alternative channel for in-kind giving in disaster
relief. We present a case from the 2012 super storm Sandy response describing how
a grass roots organization implemented an on-line version of the model with great
success.
The contributions of this thesis are:
• We provide a structured description of donors’ and NGOs’ motivations for giv-
ing and receiving in-kind donations. Although “the second disaster” manifests
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itself as a logistics problem, we argue that any effective solution to the prob-
lem requires a deeper understanding of the economic and social motivations of
donors and NGOs to engage in the behaviors that generate it. Our description
in Chapter 2 of donor and NGO motivations in the context of in-kind giving
fills an important gap in the humanitarian logistics literature.
• This thesis provides a first comprehensive study of in-kind donations including
sources, players, channels and challenges. Chapter 3 provides a formal descrip-
tion of NGO and donor roles in the distribution of in-kind donations and the
various channels they form to move donated good from original donors to final
beneficiaries. Chapter 4 discuss the various transactional and systemic chal-
lenges faced by NGOs and their donors with respect to in-kind donations in
disaster relief.
• In Chapter 5 we offer a comprehensive framework that can help NGOs and
government agencies (FEMA, CIDI) comprehend the scope of the problem and
position responses to it. Our framework provides a succinct representation of
the main issues and players involved in the process in a format that is simple
to work with and easy to understand. It supports comprehension of the many
related issues and can help NGOs and policy making bodies assess current
strategies and devise new approaches and solution strategies.
• In Chapter 5 we also propose a strategy based on a systematic, multi-layered
array of interventions each of which deters only a fraction of the inappropriate
flows, but which together dramatically diminish the problem.
• In Chapter 6 we offer a decision framework and donation assessment tool to
help NGOs make quick decisions about which in-kind donations to accept and
manage in-kind donations more strategically over time. We also propose an
alternative giving model called the “retail donation model” to help individual
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donors donate in-kind in disaster relief productively. We present a case describ-
ing an on-line implementation of the model that proved very effective.
The solution framework presented here can serve as a basis for future research in
this area as we discuss in Chapter 7. This thesis provides practical solutions to NGOs
and a road map for disaster relief advocacy groups (e.g., National Voluntary Organi-
zations Active in Disasters, NVOAD) and government agencies (FEMA, USAID and
CIDI) to significantly reduce the impact of the second disaster.
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CHAPTER II
MOTIVATIONS: WHY GIVE, WHY GIVE IN-KIND AND
WHY ACCEPT IN-KIND DONATIONS
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we explore donor motivations for giving in-kind and NGO motivations
for accepting in-kind donations. Simply put, it is very difficult to change behavior
without changing motivations and incentives. In order to reduce the second disaster,
we must understand, if not actually change, the motivations and actions that lead to
it. This chapter strives to understand why donors give in-kind and why NGOs accept
those donations.
We divide donors into three categories: individuals and community groups, gov-
ernment donors and corporate or business donors, to better understand their moti-
vations for giving in general and for giving in-kind specifically. In-kind donations by
individuals and community groups are the most visible, chaotic and poorly managed.
Frequently identified as the primary cause of the second disaster, these donations are
a primary focus of this thesis. Corporate donations are less visible, but larger and
growing. As a potential source of valuable supplies, corporate in-kind donations are
also an important focus of this thesis. Government in-kind donations from U.S. are
generally targeted and well managed (our scope of discussion is U.S. based donors)
and, while there are always opportunities for improvement, these donations are not
a major source of problems and so are not our primary focus.
There is a significant literature in philanthropy that explores why individual
donors give to charity. The literature on why donors give in-kind is limited. There is
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some work on volunteering, reviewed in Section 2.2.3, which does explore why indi-
viduals volunteer for charitable causes. While that work does shed some light on our
primary question of why donors give in-kind, we are not aware of any research that
focuses directly on donor motivations for making product donations.
Our intent is to summarize the relevant literature on donor motivations for giving.
We specialize ideas and findings about giving in general to the case of giving in-
kind. While the thesis focuses primarily on the two donor categories: individuals and
community groups and corporations, we do discuss government motivations for giving
in some depth because the extensive economics literature addressing the question of
why governments transfer social benefits in-kind provides insights into the question
of why individuals, community groups and corporations give in-kind.
This chapter addresses three questions:
1. Why do donors give? In Section 2.2.1 we review the extensive literature
from philanthropy on why individuals give and in Sections 2.3.3 we review the
corporate social responsibility literature on why companies give.
2. Why do donors give in-kind? In Sections 2.2.2, 2.2.3 and 2.3.4, we adapt
the findings on why donors give to the more specific and less extensively studied
question of why donors give in-kind.
3. Why do NGOs accept in-kind donations? In Section 2.4, we address the
question of why NGOs accept in-kind donations with special focus on the mo-
tivations for accepting less-than-ideal in-kind donations, the kinds of donations
that often generate exactly the issues and problems that make in-kind donations
such a problematic and often controversial issue.
Our cross disciplinary literature review suggests numerous and compelling moti-
vations for private in-kind donations. Those motivations are unlikely to diminish or
go away. Simply educating donors about the detrimental effect of unsolicited in-kind
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donations and encouraging cash donations in disaster relief without changing donor
and NGO motivations is unlikely to have a profound effect on behavior. We must still
be prepared to handle the inevitable in-kind donations that will continue to follow
every major disaster. In Chapter 5, we propose a comprehensive framework for un-
derstanding the relationships between motivations and actions of donors and NGOs.
The framework helps present a more complete picture of different opportunities for
influencing the flow of in-kind donations in ways that can mitigate the second disaster.
2.2 Individual and community group giving
Although what motivates people to give is primarily a behavioral question, it is in-
tertwined with other fields of study such as sociology and economics, as giving is a
social phenomenon with definite economic implications. As a consequence, philan-
thropic research has become cross-disciplinary over the years.
While the literature on why people give is large, comprehensive and crosses many
disciplines, to our knowledge no academic research explores why people choose dif-
ferent ways to donate, i.e., donate money, donate goods, donate time (volunteering),
etc. Several studies in philanthropy describe individual donor motivations for volun-
teering, but no research exists on“general” motivations for giving in-kind or giving
goods. Although we are not primarily interested in why people volunteer, under-
standing their motivations for doing so provides insights into why donors participate
in other forms of in-kind giving and, in particular, product donations. In this section
we review research findings on individual donor’s motivations for giving in general
and for in-kind giving as a specific case.
2.2.1 Mechanisms driving individual giving
In a recent cross sector literature review surveying over 500 published articles, Bekkers
et al. [56] identify eight mechanisms described in the literature from various fields as
key determinants of giving. Those mechanisms, briefly summarized in the following
20
paragraphs, are: (1) awareness of the need, (2) solicitation (3) costs and benefits (4)
altruism (5) reputation (6) psychological benefits (7) values and (8) efficacy.
2.2.1.1 Awareness of the need
Awareness of the need, as principally discussed in the social psychology literature,
refers to the donor’s knowledge and awareness of victims’ or beneficiaries’ needs and
situation through various media, such as personal experience, the experiences of rel-
atives or friends, print and digital media stories or from other information sources.
Field experiments [140, 172, 180] and survey studies [74, 136] suggest that the greater
the awareness of the need, the greater the likelihood of giving. A study by Wagner et
al. [194] suggests that subjective perceptions of needs rather than the objective need
itself influence donation behavior.
2.2.1.2 Solicitation
Solicitation refers to the act of asking a person or organization to donate. Survey
studies [67, 54] in the U.S. and the Netherlands indicate that the overwhelming ma-
jority of donations (nearly 85% in the U.S. and 86% in the Netherlands) is made in
response to some solicitation. While some aspects of the solicitation process clearly
contribute to awareness of the need, the act of solicitation also includes the distinct
dimension of confronting the target with the specific question of how to respond to
the request. Studies [198, 189] suggest there is a limit to the relationship between
the frequency of solicitation and the level of donation. At some point additional
solicitations generate “donor fatigue” and can actually reduce the level of donations.
2.2.1.3 Cost and benefit
Cost and benefit in this context refers to the balance between the expenses and difficul-
ties associated with giving and the rewards, either directly to the donor or indirectly
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to the larger community, associated with giving. A series of articles in the philan-
thropy literature [127, 55, 90] suggests that when the cost of giving is reduced, the
level of giving increases. The large body of economics research that examines the
effects various tax policies have on giving, reaches a similar conclusion (For review
articles on this topic, see Steinberg [181], Simmons et al. [174], and Peloza et al.
[153]). Andreoni et al. [42] suggest that donors tend to give more when they receive
intangible benefits such as private access to events, social recognition or perceived
enhancement in prestige, etc. in return.
2.2.1.4 Altruism
Altruism refers to selfless acts of giving for others’ welfare. Although altruism acts
as a strong motive for giving, recent economic models [40] suggest giving may not
be purely altruistic in nature. Donors also receive personal benefits from giving. In
contrast to most of the previous economics research, which modeled donors’ behavior
as purely altruistic, in 1989, Andreoni [40] argued that donors receive both personal
and societal benefits from giving, which he called “impure altruism”. Impure altruism
explains why government contributions do not significantly “crowd out” or replace
private contributions. If donors were purely altruistic and only cared about unmet
social needs, an increase in contributions from government to fulfill those needs should
reduce private contributions by a corresponding amount. Donors should be equally
happy regardless of who makes the donation.
Empirical studies [64, 134] suggest the opposite is true: Increased government
contributions do not significantly reduce private contributions. The absence of pro-
nounced crowding out suggests that factors other than pure altruism influence chari-
table giving.
2.2.1.5 Reputation
Reputation refers to the social consequences of giving or not giving. Studies [197,
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122, 143] suggest that giving to charities is regarded as a positive thing to do and
that donors gain social recognition, especially among their peers. Andreoni et al. [42]
have found that donors prefer that others be aware of their contributions. Donors
sometimes demonstrate their charitable giving through signs or wearables such as pink
ribbons, yellow bands or “Red” branded products. This phenomenon is described as
“conspicuous compassion” in the literature (see for example Grace et al. [110]). In
a laboratory experiment, Clark [76] shows that individuals are even willing to pay
so that others will recognize their contributions. On the other hand, several studies
[46, 49, 58] suggest that failing to give can damage one’s reputation when donations
are publicized and observable.
2.2.1.6 Psychological benefit
Psychological benefit refers to the emotional benefits of giving often described as
“warm glow” or “joy of giving” [41] or “empathetic joy” [50] in the literature.
A recent neuropsychological study [114] shows that donating to charity creates
brain activities in the ventral striatum and the insulae, which are generally linked to
“reward processing”. The pleasurable experience associated with giving can also come
from alleviating feelings of guilt associated with not giving, or from acting in line with
social norms and one’s own pro-social (i.e., belief in benefiting others or the society
as a whole), or altruistic self-image. A Dutch study [203] finds simply “feeling good”
is a motive for donating to charitable causes. Other studies [167, 123] find that giving
can improve one’s self-esteem and can be linked with a sense of accomplishment.
2.2.1.7 Values
Values in this context refers to a donor’s internal belief about the worthiness of a
cause. Several survey studies [52, 53, 191, 36, 196, 161, 171] suggest that people
who have pro-social values, who feel socially responsible, are less materialistic and
care more about the social order and justice are more likely to give. Giving allows
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donors to demonstrate their values and contribute to creating a better society. In
an empirical study of U.K. based charitable organizations, Bennet et al. [57] find
that people are more likely to donate to an organization whose values match their
own. Bennet and his colleagues interviewed 250 people in central London and asked
each person to imagine he had been given a certain sum of money to donate and to
choose which charity he would give to from among three NGOs working in different
fields. The authors also asked each person about his personal values, inclinations and
other characteristics. The authors found significant correlation between respondents’
personal values and the NGOs they chose.
2.2.1.8 Efficacy
Efficacy refers to a donor’s perception that his contribution makes a difference. Survey
studies [44, 86, 88, 142, 159, 179] confirm that people are less likely to give when they
perceive that their contribution is not going to make a difference. Parsons’s field based
experiment of donors’ responses [151] shows that sharing financial information or other
forms of activity reports along with mail solicitations generates more donations on
average than a fund-raising letter alone. The effect is even larger (approximately
40% more donations) for donors who had given previously. Studies in Canada and
in the U.S. [68, 187] find a positive correlation between a non-profit’s organizational
efficiency (i.e., “the degree to which nonprofits direct their available resources to the
organization’s mission”1, or the “average portion of each contribution that reaches
the organization’s beneficiaries”2) and the private donations it receives. Other survey
articles [51, 168, 44, 169, 170] suggest that people are generally averse to supporting
organizations that rely on expensive fund raising methods or have high overhead
costs.
1Page 266, Trussel, J.M. and Parsons, L.M., “Financial reporting factors affecting donations to
charitable organizations”, Advances in Accounting, Vol 23, pp. 263–285, (2007)
2Ibid.
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We know of no published research focused on individuals’ motivations for choosing
to donate in-kind rather than cash. The only work we are aware of that differenti-
ates among different modes of giving is David et al. [176]. The authors propose a
three-stage conceptual model to describe donors’ decision processes in terms of (1)
background factors (e.g. the philosophical, political and demographic characteristics
of the donor, previous experience, awareness of the need, etc.) (2) triggers (e.g.
solicitations, calls for volunteers, etc.) and (3) giving behaviors (e.g. giving cash, vol-
unteering, participating in civic organizations, etc.). David et al.’s model does not,
however, include reputation, psychological benefits or efficacy, nor does it address
how these factors influence the donor’s choice of the donation mode. It also does not
address product giving, our primary interest, as a separate mode of giving. In fact,
most of the research in philanthropy discusses general motivations for giving without
explicitly considering the mode of giving (cash vs. in-kind).
2.2.2 Economic rationale for in-kind transfers
Although it is relevant, we do not examine in detail motivations for government giving
in this thesis. In this section, we do review the extensive economic literature on the
topic of rationales behind government in-kind benefit transfers to citizen through
social welfare programs as it provides insights into the less well studied question of
why individuals, community groups and corporations give in-kind to NGOs.
Most research articles (see Currie et al. [80] for a good review) on government in-
kind transfers consider social welfare programs as many of these programs represent
enormous government obligations and transfer a significant portion of the benefits
through non-cash transfers (i.e., services, products, vouchers etc.).
In economic terms, government benefits in the form of cash transfers leave the
choice of how to consume or employ the benefit to the recipient, thereby allowing the
recipient to maximize his or her utility. In-kind transfers, on the other hand, provide
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the giver more control over how the benefit is employed, but can result in what is
referred to as “dead-weight loss” when the recipients’ value for the in-kind benefit is
less than the giver’s cost to provide it.
Numerous papers in the economics literature explore why governments transfer
benefits in-kind despite the deadweight loss (see, for example, [59, 184, 185, 146]). In
a survey article summarizing theories and models about government in-kind transfers,
Currie et al. [80] report that the leading explanations for in-kind transfers are Pater-
nalism, which we discuss in Section 2.2.2.1, and the Self-targeting nature of in-kind
transfers, which we discuss in Section 2.2.2.2.
2.2.2.1 Paternalism
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [89] defines Paternalism as “... the interfer-
ence of a state or an individual with another person, against their will, and defended
or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or protected
from harm.” In simple terms, paternalism is when the government acts like a parent,
deciding how citizens will best be served by a specific benefit, without regard to their
preferences.
Currie et al. [80] suggest that the different interpretations of paternalism in the
literature arise from different formulations of society’s social welfare function. In
one approach [152], goods that are transferred in-kind constitute an argument in the
social welfare function, thereby omitting the individual recipient’s utility for these
goods. Balsey [59] criticizes this approach as it undermines the notion of consumer
sovereignty or individual preference and proposes an alternative formulation of the
social welfare function in which social planners and individuals assign different weights
to an individual’s consumption of a particular good.
Lester [184] proposes that individuals have two distinct preferences for the con-
sumption of goods: individual-societal preferences and private-personal preferences.
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Individual societal preferences refer to an individual’s preference to have certain goods
available in society at a certain level for the overall benefit of society. A person’s
individual-societal preferences need not coincide with his or her preferences for per-
sonal consumption, i.e. private-personal preferences. For example, people might want
to see that everyone in society has access to sufficient food, even though at an in-
dividual level, they might value receiving “extra cash” over receiving the equivalent
value in food.
One school of thought (see for example, Daly et al. [81] and Garfinkel [109]) argues
that members of society who do not receive government in-kind transfers (e.g., middle
class tax payers) do derive utility from seeing that recipients have access to those
goods. Tobin [185] argues that while society accepts income inequality, it wants all
individuals to be able to meet basic needs for food, medical services, housing, etc.
Kelman suggests [129] government in-kind transfers of basic necessities are justified
or motivated by society’s perception that individuals have a right to meet certain
basic necessities, but not to the cash equivalent of those necessities.
Empirical evidence suggests that paternalism also plays a role in individual donors’
decisions regarding how to donate. In a laboratory experiment, Jacobsson et al.
[93] found that donors faced with the choice between donating money or nicotine
patches to diabetes patients who smoke, more than 90% chose to donate patches.
They concluded that individual donors can be influenced by paternalistic motives
(especially in case of health related charities) that favor in-kind giving. Breman et
al. [43] similarly found that when subjects were given a choice of donating money or
mosquito nets to an anonymous household in Zambia, nearly 65% donated at least one
mosquito net and 29% only donated mosquito nets. These empirical results support
Tobin’s argument [185] that paternalism is more prevalent with causes that involve
basic necessities, such as food, health, housing, etc. Since disaster relief provides
basic necessities, we may expect paternalism to play an important role in influencing
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donor decisions in that context.
2.2.2.2 Self-targeting under imperfect information
Programs designed to benefit a specific target group can be difficult to monitor and
costly to administer if benefits are transferred through cash. In a targeted benefit
transfer program, individuals are expected to identify themselves through publicly
verifiable attributes such as income. Since everyone values cash, these programs must
manage numerous applicants from outside the target population. Nicholas et al.
[146] argue that in-kind transfers can help focus benefits in so far as the intended
target group values the in-kind transfers more than others outside the group do. For
example, poor or hungry people will place a higher value on receiving food than
those who are better off. Government in-kind transfer programs force beneficiaries to
endure certain “ordeals” to collect in-kind benefits with the goal of deterring those
outside the target population (who supposedly place a lower value on the benefit).
In this way, in-kind transfers can ensure that a greater portion of the benefits go to
intended beneficiaries, a phenomenon know as target efficiency [146]. The ordeals are
more effective at deterring “outsiders” if the benefits are given in-kind.
Designing an efficient transfer of in-kind benefits for a specific target population
requires finding the right balance between their value to the target population and
the participation cost. A significant majority of the target population should find the
value of the benefits higher than the participation cost, while a significant majority
of those outside the target population should find the value lower than the cost.
The “outsiders” can also include corrupt organizations and people involved in the
distribution process. Sometimes government foreign aid is donated in-kind in the
belief that officials and organizations in the recipient country will find the goods less
attractive and harder to misappropriate than cash. For example, in an empirical
study, Raschky et al. [160] find that existing corruption and the absence of rule of
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law in the recipient country are positively correlated with a greater percentage of
foreign aid being donated in-kind. Another study [37] shows that the percentage of
tied donations3 from multi-lateral donors decreases as governance improves in the
recipient country.
Other types of donors are also concerned about corruption and abuse, and target
efficiency is an important motivation for individual donors to give in-kind. If donors
are not certain that most of their donation will serve final beneficiaries and make an
impact, they are less willing to give. Because donating time (volunteering) or donating
products helps ensure that the more of the donation is likely to actually reach the
intended beneficiary, donors may choose to donate in-kind rather than cash.
Generally, NGOs act as agents to help beneficiaries on behalf of donors. NGOs use
cash donations to provide goods and services to beneficiaries and to pay for overhead
expenses (staff salaries, facilities and office expenses, etc.). Many donors fear that
a significant portion of their cash donations may be used for the NGO’s overhead
expenses rather than to help the intended beneficiaries. Giving in-kind helps ensure
that the donation will only be used to help beneficiaries and cannot be used for the
NGO’s overhead expenses. The challenge this naturally raises is that the NGO does
need funds to cover its overhead expenses and to build its capacity to provide valuable
services.
Paternalism and higher target efficiency motivate government and private donors
to prefer in-kind giving, but these are not the only reasons private donors prefer to
give in-kind. The philanthropy literature on why people volunteer, which we review in
Section 2.2.3, provides additional insights into private donors’ motivations for giving
in-kind.
3According to the OECD, tied aid includes official grants or loans that require recipient countries
to procure goods and services from companies in the donor country or in a small group of specified
countries.
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2.2.3 Determinants of volunteering
The one area of in-kind giving that has received considerable attention in the litera-
ture is volunteering. In this section we review the literature on why people volunteer
to help us better understand motivations for donating products. In fact, these two
activities are quite closely linked. In many cases, product donation creates opportu-
nities for volunteering such as collecting, sorting and packaging donated products.
In his review, Wilson [201] classifies research on volunteering into two perspectives:
sociological and behavioral. The sociological perspective of volunteering describes
donors as rational human beings and emphasizes the context of giving (education,
income, social network, family status, etc.) as influencing individual decisions to vol-
unteer, while behavioral theories emphasize individual motives, values and beliefs as
the main factors influencing the choice to volunteer. Researchers [130, 79] have found
that a desire to help others is one of the most frequently cited reasons for volunteer-
ing. Cnaan et al. [79] show that egoistic concerns such as satisfying personal social
and psychological goals, also motivate volunteers. Researchers in social psychology
have identified an inventory of individual motives for volunteering. Clary et al. [78],
for example, identified six motives for volunteering:
Values: The volunteer expresses or acts on his or her personal values;
Understanding: The volunteer seeks “new learning experiences and the chance to
exercise knowledge, skills and abilities”4;
Enhancement: The volunteer hopes to grow psychologically and improve self-esteem;
Career: The volunteer wishes to gain career related experience and skills;
4Page 1518, Clary, E.G., et al., “Understanding and assessing the motivations of volunteers: a
functional approach”, Journal of personality and social psychology, Vol. 74, no. 6, pp 1516–1530,
(1998)
30
Social: The volunteer hopes to strengthen social relationships with friends and im-
portant others;
Protective: The volunteer seeks to reduce negative feelings (e.g., guilt) about being
more fortunate than others.
The differences between Clary et al.’s [78] motives for volunteering and Bekkers
et al.’s [56] eight mechanisms that influence giving arise primarily because of the
differences in the questions the two studies address. Bekkers et al. ask what factors
affect individual giving, while Clary et al. focus on the motivations for volunteering.
Bekkers et al. consider the broad category of mechanisms that can affect choices or
actions, while Clary et al. employ a functional approach, which views motivations as
causes of choices or actions. Neither study specifically addresses the question of how
people choose between giving cash or giving goods or volunteering.
Using David et al.’s [176] conceptual model, Awareness of need and Solicitation
mentioned by Bekkers et al. [56] can be characterized as “triggers” rather than
motives for giving. Clary et al. do not include these triggers as volunteering motives.
Although Bekkers et al. identify altruism as one of the eight determinants of giving,
Clary et al. [78] do not include it as a motive for volunteering. However, empirical
and experimental studies [84, 70] demonstrate strong relationships between altruism
and Clary et al.’s six motives for volunteering.
Bekkers et al.’s Cost and Benefit and Efficacy do not appear in Clary et al.’s six
motives for volunteering. This may in part be based on the nature of the questions
Clary et al. are trying to answer. They work from the premise that “...volunteers (a)
often actively seek out opportunities to help others; (b) may deliberate for consid-
erable amounts of time about whether to volunteer, the extent of their involvement,
and the degree to which particular activities fit with their own personal needs; and
(c) may make a commitment to an ongoing helping relationship that may extend
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over a considerable period of time and that may entail considerable personal costs of
time, energy, and opportunity.”5 The authors do not address the question of what
motivates the individual to choose volunteering over other forms of helping. This may
in part explain the absence of Cost and Benefit and Efficacy as volunteering does not
cost money and poses little chance for fraud or abuse.
The same argument can be extended to other types of in-kind giving (e.g., used
clothing donations or pro-bono services) which do not involve costs to participate and
are more resistant to fraud and abuse. Cost and Benefit and Efficacy are important
components of the decision of how to give, but may play a smaller role in the decision
of whether to give.
Several papers [65, 87, 94, 69] in the economics literature consider the question of
whether giving cash and donating time are substitutes or complements for each other.
There is no clear consensus on the question and Andreoni [39] suggests that the answer
depends on the assumptions made about donor’s preferences. If the donor’s emotional
reward depends on total giving (i.e., total contributions of cash and time), then
assuming the value of volunteering is lower than the wages one could earn in the same
time, volunteering would be rare as donors could have a greater impact by working and
donating the added wages instead of volunteering. However, volunteering is anything
but rare in industrialized countries, especially in the U.S.. In 2011, 64.3 million
Americans (more than one in four adults) volunteered through formal organizations.
Andreoni [39] concludes volunteering must offer some independent emotional reward.
We find Andreoni’s “impure altruism” model overly restrictive for in-kind giving
as donors may receive tangible economic benefits from in-kind giving along with emo-
tional benefits. For example, Clary et al.’s model identifies career and understanding
5page 1517, Clary, E.G. et al., “Understanding and assessing the motivations of volunteers: a
functional approach”, Journal of personality and social psychology, vol. 74, no. 6, pp 1516 – 1530
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as motives for volunteering. Volunteers may, for example, receive relevant profes-
sional experiences through volunteering, which can enhance their careers. Similarly,
donating used personal and household items helps individuals dispose of excess be-
longings and provides tax benefits in the process. We argue that for in-kind giving,
self interest motives may extend beyond the emotional benefits Andreoni suggests
and donors may be motivated by both emotional and economic benefits from giving.
The decision to give in-kind as opposed to cash is a separate question from what
motivates giving in general. Individual donors have few options when giving to a
NGO. They can: (1) Give cash (2) Buy specific products and services to donate
to the NGO; e.g. buy food specifically to donate to a food bank, or pay for the
transportation of relief supplies, etc. (3) Give products that they already own, e.g.,
used clothing or (4) Give time (i.e., volunteer). The question is why donors choose
in-kind giving options rather than cash. We also recognize that the donation of goods
can be triggered by the need to resolve a situation involving excess goods rather than
by the NGO’s need for those goods. The decision to dispose of excess goods by
donating them to charity does not raise the question of whether to donate cash or
donate in-kind. Instead, that decision is focused on questions of which NGO to give
to and, often, when it is best to make the donation.
2.2.4 In-kind vs. cash giving for individual donors
In this section we discuss factors that influence individual donors’ decisions to do-
nate goods and services. The assumption here is that these individuals are already
motivated to give, but recognize that decision may be contingent on giving in-kind,
i.e., we recognize that some donors may choose between giving in-kind or not giving
at all while others may choose between giving in-kind and giving cash. The primary
conundrum is “Why do donors give in-kind despite all the advertizing campaigns,
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educational efforts and news articles arguing against in-kind donations?”. We sum-
marize various donor motivations and explanations discussed in the literature and
based on our own observations into four principal factors.
2.2.4.1 Trust
Donating to an NGO involves trust at many levels. Donors must trust the beneficiary
to use the donation appropriately. For example, by giving nicotine patches rather than
cash, the donors in Jacobsson et al.’s [93] study did not need to trust the beneficiaries
not to use the donation to buy cigarettes. This form of trust is addressed in the
literature under the rubric of Paternalism. Donors must trust the process to deliver
the donation to the beneficiaries. For example, governments transfer benefits in-
kind in part because they want to dissuade “outsiders” for taking advantage of the
donation. This form of trust is addressed in the literature under the rubric of target
efficiency. Finally, donors must trust the NGO itself to ensure donations are used for
the intended purpose and are not diverted to cover overhead expenses or to support
fund raising activities. This form of trust is addressed in the literature under the
rubric of efficacy. In each case, donating goods and services reduces the level of trust
involved.
2.2.4.2 Engagement
Engagement refers to the physical and social dimensions of charitable activities. Vol-
unteering, for example, engages the donor physically in an activity he views as good
or worthy. Olivola et al. [149] show that despite the long held view of physical dis-
comfort as a deterrent, many donors actually prefer that charity work be physically
demanding. The authors argue that people derive a sense of satisfaction and pride
from hard-earned accomplishments such as completing a charity marathon. A phe-
nomenon the authors refer to as “The Martyrdom Effect”. Volunteering is also often
socially engaging in that it engages the donor together with a group in an activity
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the group views as good or worthy. Clary et al. [78] identify the social dimension of
engagement under the rubric of Social.
In-kind giving generally provides greater opportunities for donor engagement than
giving cash. Organizing a community food or clothing drive helps bring the commu-
nity together and physically engages its members in activities such as collecting,
sorting and packing donations, providing transportation, etc. Giving goods to disas-
ter relief creates opportunities for physical and social engagement, which may in part
explain why individuals and community groups donate in-kind despite NGO’s efforts
to promote cash donations.
2.2.4.3 Directness
Donors prefer to help beneficiaries directly. We argue that the emotional benefits of
giving diminish with the distance or separation in the usual sense of proximity, in the
sense of time and in the sense of the intermediaries and transformations between the
act of giving and the beneficiary’s receipt of the gift. We refer to this phenomenon
as directness or emotional engagement. Volunteering at a local soup kitchen is a very
direct way to give. The donor is present and personally involved in transferring the
gift to the beneficiary. Purchasing food and donating it to a soup kitchen is less direct:
the donor is not present when the beneficiary receives the gift, but the gift itself serves
as a clear connection between the act of donation and its receipt. Donating cash to a
food bank is still less direct. Not only is the act of donating removed from the receipt
of the gift, but the cash injects yet another degree of distance: The cash the donor
gave is only abstractly connected to the gift the beneficiary received. Whom exactly
did the gift benefit and what exactly did the beneficiary receive from the donor’s
gift? The enormous distance between the act of making a small cash donation and
the benefits that gift delivers to the final beneficiary strains the imagination of most
individual donors.
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The desire to give more directly is also related to issues of trust and engagement.
By giving more directly, the donor has a greater assurance that the gift will go to the
beneficiary and a better sense of exactly what the gift will be. But we use the word
“directness” to refer to the effects on the emotional benefits of giving. Donating more
directly increases trust and engagement (e.g., volunteering at local soup kitchen),
but increasing trust and engagement does not necessarily increase directness. Even
though it may be more effective and engaging to organize a fund raising event and
donate the (cash) proceeds to a trustworthy NGO to purchase specific supplies for
relief efforts after a specific disaster, it will not be as direct and will not provide the
same emotional satisfaction as giving a blanket or the shirt off one’s back.
2.2.4.4 Economic
Donors want to enjoy the tangible and intangible benefits of giving at minimum cost.
Donating used personal items, previously purchased packaged food, etc. allows an
individual to contribute without incurring any specific additional cash expense. In
fact, individuals can enjoy tax benefits from donating goods to registered NGOs in
the U.S.. And many do: The IRS reports [138] that over 7 million people in the U.S.
itemized deductions for in-kind donations totaling $ 34.9 billion in 2010. Although
cash donations are eligible for tax deduction as well, in-kind donations do not require
a cash outlay and can transform items for which the donor no longer has a use into
tax deductions.
2.3 Corporate or business giving in the U.S.
Most Fortune 500 companies have philanthropic initiatives and mechanisms in place
to donate to NGOs either directly or via a corporate foundation. According to Giving
USA [150], corporations donated a total of $16.18 billion or nearly 5.5% of the total
giving of $305 billion in the U.S. in 2011. Based on a survey [20] of 213 companies,
including 62 of the Fortune 100 companies, the Committee Encouraging Corporate
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Philanthropy (CECP) estimated total giving of $15.72 billion in cash and product
donations in that same year. According to CECP, nearly $10.12 billion of the total
$15.72 billion was donated in-kind. Although there are inconsistencies in the various
estimates, it is clear that in-kind giving represents a substantial segment of corporate
donations in the U.S.. The majority of corporate donations are made to NGOs both
domestically and internationally. In this section, we discuss why corporations donate
to NGOs and why they choose to donate in-kind.
In sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, we review the evolution of and key debates around
corporate philanthropy in the U.S.. The history and evolution of corporate philan-
thropic practices shape the current state of corporate giving to NGOs and establish
the paradigm for corporate social responsibility (CSR) that underlies corporate do-
nation practices.
2.3.1 Corporate giving in the U.S.: a historical perspective
Ireland et al. [124] define corporate philanthropy as a transfer of corporate resources
to recipients for charitable purposes at or below market prices. Although corporate
giving to NGOs is a common practice today, before 1953 it was legally limited to
donations that could be justified as business related expenses (see Fry et al. [105]
or Sharfman [173] for excellent discussions of the history of corporate philanthropy
in the U.S.). Private giving was primarily an individual act, though privately owned
businesses did donate to charity. For corporations the question was whether managers
had the right to donate stockholders’ assets in the corporation.
In this section, we summarize Sharfman’s [173] history of corporate philanthropy
in the U.S.. The historical perspective of corporate philanthropy in the U.S. helps
us to understand important debates and issues that shaped current corporate phil-
anthropic practices and motivations for giving to NGOs in the U.S..
There were few corporations in the U.S. in the nineteen century and legitimate
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corporate acts were defined by contractual agreements or founding charters. Donat-
ing to charity was not generally deemed to be a legitimate corporate act unless the
donation advanced some identifiable business interest. The beginning of corporate
philanthropy in the U.S. can be traced back to the late nineteenth century when
a few manufacturing companies (e.g., the Pullman Company) started to fund local
schools, libraries and other facilities in company towns. The goal was to attract
workers to often remote manufacturing sites and such philanthropic activities were
regarded as indirect business related expenses.
By the end of nineteen century several court rulings established the right of corpo-
rations to make charitable contributions as long as they supported business objectives.
The two most definitive rulings were 1896 Steinway vs. Steinway & Sons, et al. [9]
and 1899 Main vs. C.B. & Q. Railroad [173]. Steinway & Sons corporate trustees
contributed funds to build homes, churches and schools for Steinway employees and
C.B. & Q. Railroad contributed to a benefit society for its employees. The court in
these cases ruled the expenses were “related” to company activities and hence within
the incidental power of the firm.
As industrialization progressed in the early twentieth century (1900-1915), com-
pany towns were largely replaced by cities with a new class of urban poor. During
this period, anti-business sentiment grew, fueled by journalists, including Ida Tarbell,
known as “muckrakers”, who wrote about the injustices and tragedies that accom-
panied industrialization. Many new charities developed in the cities to help the poor
and corporations were pressured to support them. The crises of World War I and the
Great Depression added to the pressure on businesses to help meet social needs in
their communities.
Many companies started to donate to various charities in larger cities and the
practice became more common in the 1920s. In 1932, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) loosened its guidelines regarding donations that could be deducted as expenses
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and in 1935 Congress approved legislation allowing corporations to deduct charitable
donations of up to 5% of pretax income. The question of whether corporations were
allowed to make contributions unrelated to the business was not legally resolved until
1953, when a group of stockholders challenged a $1500 donation managers at A. P.
Smith Manufacturing Co. made to Princeton University for general use and without
any obvious financial benefit to the company. The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled
in favor of the company and, by refusing to the hear the case, the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the decision without commenting on the legality of the donation.
Although the legal challenge for corporate philanthropy was resolved in 1953,
the debate about whether companies have a responsibility to address social needs
continued.
2.3.2 The evolution of corporate social responsibility
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) concepts have influenced corporate philan-
thropy over the last decades (mainly since 1970). In a 1970 New York Times Magazine
article [103], Milton Friedman suggested that the social responsibility of a corporation
is to increase profits, individuals (i.e., shareholders and employees) should make phil-
anthropic decisions about their own assets. He argued that corporate managers should
not make charitable contributions with shareholders’ money. Friedman claimed the
responsibility of the corporate executive
. . . is to conduct the business in accordance with their (owners’) desires,
which generally will be to make as much money as possible while con-
forming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and
those embodied in ethical custom.6
6Friedman, M., “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits”, The New York
Times Magazine, September 13, 1970
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The debate Friedman started in 1970 has waned as more and more companies
have accepted the concept of corporate social responsibility. Most academics and
the preponderance of public opinion agrees that companies do have a responsibility
to society as well as to customers, employees and shareholders. The concept of cor-
porate social responsibility has become increasingly comprehensive. In one of the
seminal articles of modern CSR, Carroll [71] defined corporate social responsibility
as encompassing
... the economic, legal, ethical and discretionary expectations that
society has of organizations at a given point in time.7
According to Carroll [71], a company’s philanthropic activities fall under discre-
tionary expectations: the business does not have “responsibility” per se, but society
does expect the company to contribute to social issues. In a subsequent article, Car-
roll [72] presented a conceptual pyramid of corporate social responsibility with phil-
anthropic responsibilities at the top as “icing on the cake”, something that is highly
desired and prized and perhaps even expected but not, like the other dimensions of
corporate social responsibility (i.e. economic, legal and ethical), required.
In his review of the evolution of CSR theories, Lee [137] claims that since the 1980’s
the concept of CSR has evolved into an integral part of business strategy specifically
related to a company’s reputation and stakeholder management. Freeman’s [102]
stakeholder management theory suggests a new framework for understanding corpo-
rate goals in which the central issue is the survival of the company, which depends
not only on its shareholders but also on various other stakeholders such as customers,
employees, suppliers, the local community, government, non-profit groups, etc. In the
1980s, management researchers (led by Clarkson [77] and Jones [126]) conceptualized
CSR from a stakeholder management perspective, replacing the vague notion of social
7Page 500, Carroll, A.B., “A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate performance”,
Academy of management review (1979)
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expectations with the more actionable concept of stakeholder concerns.
In this framework, corporate philanthropy is viewed as a useful instrument for
managing stakeholder relations.
In the twenty-first century, the concept of corporate social responsibility has be-
come embedded in the larger framework of “Sustainability” widely adopted among
Fortune 500 companies. Sustainability addresses three aspects of corporate responsi-
bility: Economic, Environmental and Social. The 1987 World Commission on Envi-
ronment and Development [66] defines sustainability as
...development that meets the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their needs.8
Most of the management and operations literature has conceptualized sustain-
ability as addressing the interactions among a company’s environmental, economic
and social goals. Kiron et al.’s [131] 2012 global survey of 4,000 managers from 113
countries suggests that sustainability related strategies are now a competitive neces-
sity for companies. A study of Fortune Global 500 companies’ sustainability reports
[202] reveals that nearly 67% of the companies produced some form of sustainability
report during 2009 and 2010 and that most focused on energy efficiency and envi-
ronmental stewardship in business activities. In most cases, corporate philanthropic
activities and their social impacts are not measured or monitored with the same rigor
as economic and environmental performance.
Porter et al. [155] argue that most companies fail to integrate philanthropy within
their business strategy and only use it to improve their public image and reputa-
tion. The authors argue that if corporate philanthropy is done on an unfocused,
piecemeal basis and comes at the expense of economic benefits for the company, then
8Page 500, World Commission on Environment and Development., Report of the World Commis-
sion on Environment and Development: Our Common Future
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Friedman’s arguments [103] are valid and company managers should not make philan-
thropic decisions with shareholders’ assets. If companies can simultaneously achieve
both economic and social benefits, corporate philanthropy can be beneficial for the
company and for society as a whole.
2.3.3 Corporate giving motivations
As we argued in Section 2.2, individual giving is motivated by both altruistic and
egoistic concerns. Corporations, however, are legal entities organized to generate
profits for investors and we argue that legal entities cannot be motivated by altruism,
i.e., a selfless regard of concern for others’ welfare. This is the core of Friedman’s
[103] argument against corporate philanthropy. If corporate giving is purely altruistic,
individuals investors are better off making philanthropic decisions themselves as they
derive personal psychological and social benefits from giving that cannot accrue to a
legal entity.
From the perspective of stakeholder management theory, companies give primarily
to satisfy various stakeholders’ expectations. Companies approach corporate philan-
thropy along a spectrum that ranges from reactive, in which philanthropy is employed
as a bandaid after damage has already been done, to pro-active, in which the com-
pany builds understanding of and credibility with key (potential) critics in an effort
to avoid surprises and better manage crises. Companies also use philanthropy to pro-
mote their brands and engage employees and customers through initiatives such as
employee volunteering, work place giving, cause related marketing, etc. Some com-
panies also differentiate themselves based on philanthropic or social values such as
Patagonia, Newman’s Own, Tom’s Shoes and others. In sections 2.3.3.1 – 2.3.3.4 we
discuss specific ways companies use philanthropy.
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2.3.3.1 Managing corporate reputation
Corporate donations are made to manage the expectations of various external stake-
holders, such as non-profit activist groups, NGOs, government, local communities,
etc. Pro-active corporations not only comply with the law of the land, but also use
corporate philanthropy as a tool to cultivate what has come to be called “social li-
cense” by building relations with and gaining acceptance from various stakeholders
in the community [112].
Smith [177] suggests companies also donate to create a reserve of “goodwill” and
to improve their public image in a proactive way. Brammer et al. [63] did find
empirical evidence among large U.K. companies that suggests companies with higher
philanthropic expenditures have better reputations, but the evidence is not conclusive
and varies by industry. The authors find that corporate philanthropic giving has a
greater effect on companies’ reputations in industries that face public criticism such
as the alcohol and tobacco industries. Brammer et al.’s finding is consistent with
Williams et al.’s study [200] that argues that philanthropic contributions may help
companies protect against negative stakeholder perceptions.
Not giving can sometimes harm a donor’s reputation. We are not aware of any
study in corporate giving that specifically explores the effects of not giving, but several
studies (see for examples [35, 58]) suggest that not giving can harm an individual’s
reputation, especially when donations are announced in public or are directly observ-
able.
Just as reputation is such an important driver of individual giving that donors are
willing to pay to ensure that others recognize their contributions, Porter et al. [155]
point out that the tobacco company Philip Morris made charitable contributions of
$75 million in 1999 and then launched a $100 million advertising campaign to publicize
those donations. Clearly reputation is an important driver of corporate donations.
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2.3.3.2 Brand promotion
Companies also use philanthropic activities to differentiate themselves from the com-
petition and to promote customer loyalty. Publicizing philanthropic contributions
helps demonstrate social values to potential customers, employees and other stake-
holders. This type of brand promotion requires focused philanthropic activities in
carefully chosen areas. Companies like Ben & Jerry’s, Newman’s Own and Patag-
onia, for example, have distinguished themselves from the competition though long
term commitments to various social and environmental issues.
Since the 1980’s companies have increasingly used philanthropy to boost sales
through various cause related marketing efforts in which the company ties a certain
percentage of the revenues to a charitable cause (for a good review of cause related
marketing see Varadarajan et al. [193]). In recent years, many companies have par-
ticipated in high profile cause related marketing campaigns such as Bono’s (Product)
Red campaign to fight HIV/AIDS in Africa, the pink ribbon campaign for research
and treatment for breast cancer, etc. Some companies have embedded corporate phi-
lanthropy into their corporate mission statements. “Tom’s Shoes”, which donates
one pair of shoes for every pair it sells, has made corporate philanthropy an integral
part of its business. Started in 2006 with annual sales of 10,000 pairs of shoes, the
company reports [31] having sold over 10 million pairs of shoes by 2013 and donated
an equal number in 60 countries.
2.3.3.3 Employee engagement
Motivating employees is often cited (see, for example, [60, 155]) as one of the ma-
jor reasons companies engage in philanthropic activities. Historically corporate phi-
lanthropy (see section 2.3.1 for details) was intended to promote employee welfare
by funding schools, hospitals and other social services in company towns. Today
employees are no longer the beneficiaries of company contributions, instead these
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contributions are intended to provide employees with opportunities to participate in
philanthropic activities that help others.
A 2011 Forbes survey [4] of over 300 corporate executives from large companies
(with annual revenues of at least $500 million) found employee motivation was most
frequently mentioned as a major objective of giving programs. Employee volunteering
is a popular program for many large companies in the U.S.. According to a 2011 CECP
survey [20] of 186 companies, 85% reported having a formal domestic (U.S.) employee
volunteering program, while 47% reported having at least one formal international
volunteering program.
2.3.3.4 Strategic benefits
Porter et al. [155] suggest that companies can use philanthropy to “improve their
competitive context - the quality of business environment in the location or locations
where they operate.” They argue that strategic use of corporate philanthropy can
create both economic benefit for the company and social impact. A good example of
strategic corporate giving is Cisco’s networking academy, which trains network ad-
ministrators in many developing counties simultaneously creating jobs and alleviating
potential constraints on growth in Cisco’s markets.
Many pharmaceutical companies have developed “signature giving programs” such
as Pfizer’s Zithromax R© donation program to fight blinding Trachoma (see Pfizer’s re-
port on this initiative [5]) or Merck and Glaxo SmithKline’s joint program to eliminate
river blindness and lymphatic filarriasis in African countries (for more on these pro-
grams see [3]). Such targeted corporate philanthropic programs help millions of people
in need while simultaneously helping the company establish critical global relation-
ships with international organizations (e.g., World Health Organization) and national
health organizations (e.g., national Ministries of Health) in developing countries. The
companies work with non-profit partners and local government agencies to facilitate
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large scale drug distribution. These relationships, infrastructure development, local
experience and knowledge of local health care needs all help donor companies’ long
term business growth in these markets.
These benefits motivate companies to participate in philanthropy. In Section 2.3.4
we explore why companies choose in-kind giving.
2.3.4 Cash vs. in-kind corporate giving
According to CECP’s annual giving report, “Giving in Numbers, 2012” [20], nearly
64% of total corporate giving by large companies, valued at over $10 billion dollars,
was given in-kind in 2011 and nearly 71% of that was donated in the form of products.
In this section we explore why companies choose to donate in-kind and especially why
they choose to donate products.
2.3.4.1 Cost and benefit
In-kind giving of products, services or employee volunteering are often the most cost
effective ways for companies to give to NGOs. In-kind donations do not require
additional cash resources and instead can utilize companies’ products, services and
people. An in-kind donation is perceived by the public at its full market value, but
only affects the company’s financial performance based on its cost to produce or
deliver. For example, a company with a gross margin of 50% can donate $100 worth
of goods at a cost of $50. A $100 cash donation, on the other hand, costs the company
$100. In the U.S., in-kind donations are also eligible for enhanced tax benefits. See
Table 2 for a detailed example.
Per U.S. tax code IRC 170(e)(3), companies can benefit from enhanced tax de-
ductions for a donation of property (donations of professional services or employee
time do not qualify for enhanced deduction) to a public charity or private operating
foundation that is an IRS 501(c)(3) organization so long as the donation:
• Is used “solely for the care of the ill, the needy, or infants, and in a manner
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related to the donee’s exempt purpose”9;
• Is not “transferred by the donee in exchange for money, other property, or
services”10; and
• Satisfies “certain requirements of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act”11.
Contributions that meet these requirements are eligible for tax deductions that exceed
the basis or cost of the goods, up to twice the basis or the basis plus one-half of the
“gross margin” or difference between the market value and the cost, whichever is
smaller. To be clear, qualifying donations generate tax deductions, not tax credits.
They do not directly reduce the taxes owed, they reduce the income on which tax
obligations are calculated. Their final impact on net operating profits after taxes
(NOPAT) will depend on the company’s tax rate.
Table 2: Example of inventory donation vs. cash donation
Inventory donation Cash donation
1. Fair Market Value $100 $100
2. Basis (Cost Of Goods Sold) $50 $100
3. Gross Margin (1-2) $50 $0
4. 2 X Basis $100 N.A.
5. Basis + 1/2 Gross Margin $75 N.A.
6. Tax deductible amount $75 $100
7. Tax deduction (at 30% tax rate) $22.5 $30
8. Net cost to the company (2-7) $27.5 $70
The example in Table 2 illustrates how, by donating products, a company can
enjoy the publicity and other social benefits associated with a $100 donation at a
fraction of the cost. The effects of the tax benefits are greatest for high value, high
margin products, such as pharmaceuticals, health care supplies, software, etc. Ac-
cording to the 2012 CECP Giving Report [20], 72% of the products donated by the





2.3.4.2 Availability of surplus inventories
One increasingly common form of corporate giving is donations of surplus inventories.
Companies do not always first decide to give and then choose surplus inventory do-
nation as the way to give. A company’s decision to give can be triggered by the need
to dispose of surplus inventories in a manner that is cost efficient and does not upset
shareholders or other stakeholders (i.e., is socially and environmentally responsible).
As explained on CFO.com [178], tax benefits, disposal costs and other factors can
make donating surplus inventories financially more attractive than other options, in-
cluding return or reuse, disposal and liquidation. A 2012 study by Indiana University
[27] on product philanthropy and a 2013 article [125] on surplus inventory donation
reach similar conclusions.
Financial incentives for surplus inventory donation can also encourage opportunis-
tic “dumping” of unsaleable inventories to events like large scale disaster relief. Do-
nating “dead” inventories to disaster relief helps managers resolve obsolete inventory
issues without upsetting shareholders. Donating obsolete inventories to long term
social issues is harder for managers to justify, especially if the issues are not clearly
aligned with a larger corporate strategy.
2.3.4.3 Employee engagement
Donating company products and services for charitable purposes can help improve
employee morale. Employees may find their work more meaningful when the products
of their efforts help fulfill social needs. In-kind donation also creates opportunities
for companies to organize employee volunteering events. While cash donations and
employee matching grants can improve employee morale, volunteering opportunities
tied to the company’s donations of products and services create a more direct and
physically and socially engaging experience for employees.
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2.3.4.4 Visibility
The tangible nature of the in-kind giving can help a company attract greater me-
dia attention to its philanthropic efforts and its brands. For example, P&G sends
the mobile laundromat “Tide Loads of Hope” to disaster affected areas in the U.S.
to promote the brand and demonstrate the company’s commitment to the affected
communities.
Donating products generates positive publicity both when the products are do-
nated and when they are distributed to beneficiaries. For example, according to a
2010 CNBC news article [165], the sunglass maker Oakley received $41 million worth
of media exposure for their donation of 35 pairs of special sunglasses to the Chilean
miners to protect their eyes after they were rescued from the mine.
Companies are increasingly giving in-kind and, for the reasons presented here,
that trend is likely to continue.
2.4 NGO motivations for accepting in-kind donations
The CECP Giving Report [30] estimates that in 2012, U.S. companies made nearly
$10 billion in qualifying in-kind donations, each of which must have been accepted by
a 501(c)(3) organization. Although NGOs prefer cash donations, it is easy to under-
stand why they accept appropriate in-kind donations from companies and individual
donors. Not all in-kind donations, however, are appropriate. We wish to understand
what motivates NGOs to accept in-kind donations that are less than appropriate. We
do not address here the more general question of whether NGOs should accept in-kind
donations at all. Nor do we address the more specific question of whether a specific
NGO should accept a given in-kind donation offer. Here, we address the motivations
behind NGOs’ decisions to accept in-kind donation offers, especially the motivations
for accepting those offers that fall into the gray area in terms of appropriateness.
We know of no published research that explores NGO motivations for accepting
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billions of dollars worth of corporate in-kind donations every year while publicly
advocating for cash donations. In order to understand and document the process and
the NGOs’ motivations, we engaged with several national and international NGOs
over the course of our research and interviewed many NGO professionals involved with
in-kind fund raising and the distribution of in-kind donations. We also conducted a
formal survey of 34 NGO professionals managing in-kind donations for 30 NGOs that
collectively accept over $1.5 billion worth of in-kind donations annually (See Appendix
A for survey details). Sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.4 summarize our findings.
2.4.1 To supplement declining cash donations
With the increased number of NGOs in the U.S., competition for donor dollars is
greater than ever. According to the Urban Institute’s National Center for Charitable
Statistics [22], the number of registered public charities (i.e., 501(c)(3) organizations)
increased by 46% between 2000 and 2010 to nearly 980,000. Giving USA [188] es-
timates12 that total annual giving by U.S. donors increased by only 1%, from $ 306
billion to $ 308 billion (in inflation adjusted dollars) over that same period. And,
as we point out in Chapter 1, corporations are donating an increasing share of what
they give in-kind rather than in cash and grants.
With increased competition for cash donations and more donors giving in-kind,
NGOs are more inclined to utilize in-kind donations to supplement their cash re-
sources. NGOs generally sell in-kind donations from individual donors and use do-
nated goods from corporate donors for various program activities. We discuss how
NGOs utilize in-kind donations in Chapter 3.
12Giving USA uses data from various sources, including the IRS, CECP and others, to estimate
total giving (both cash and in-kind) in the U.S.
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Figure 3: Responses from NGOs that receive 70% or more of their in-kind donations
from original donors




Accepting in-kind donations is important for NGOs to maintain their relationships
with corporate donors. Rejecting a donation offer can jeopardize the relationship with
the donor and put future donations, including cash donations, at risk. Our survey of
NGO professionals indicates the importance of donor relationships in deciding which
donation offers to accept. To understand the discussion, it is important to define
various NGO and donor roles in the distribution of corporate in-kind donations, which
we discuss in Chapter 3.
The 2009 AERDO13 Interagency Gifts in Kind (GIK) Standard [14] identifies and
defines four key categories of entities involved in GIK distribution: Original donor,
Final beneficiary, End-use organization and Intermediary. We adapt these definitions
and use them to clarify the different motivations of the different kinds of NGOs.
Original Donor: Original donor refers to a corporation, individual or community
group that produced or acquired a product and donated it to a charitable orga-
nization.
An original donor is the entity responsible for transferring a product from the
private or commercial realm to the charitable or non-profit realm. We use the
term to distinguish original donors from NGOs that pass along or donate to
other NGOs. An original donor is generally not an NGO.
Final Beneficiary: Final beneficiary refers to an individual or family that ultimately
receives and uses or benefits from the donation.
Ideally, final beneficiaries are the target population served by the last NGO in
the donation chain. For example, final beneficiaries for donated food through
food banks are the people who receive the donations at a local food pantry or
13A network of Christian humanitarian organizations working to eliminate poverty, currently
known as Accord
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soup kitchen. Similarly, final beneficiaries for in-kind donations to the Salvation
Army are the elderly people in the community served by the adult rehabilitation
centers supported by the Salvation Army’s thrift stores in the U.S. [7].
End-use organization: End-use organization refers to an NGO that either uses
a donation for its own operations, coverts it to cash or distributes it to final
beneficiaries.
An end-use organization is the last NGO in the donation chain. For example, lo-
cal food pantries and soup kitchens that distribute the food to final beneficiaries
either as prepared meals or as affordable groceries are the end-use organizations
for food donated to food banks.
Intermediary: Intermediary refers to an NGO that receives a donation and passes
it on to other NGOs.
Intermediaries receive donations from original donors or other intermediaries
and donate them to either an end-use organization or another intermediary.
We argue that some NGOs, in particular those that receive significant in-kind
donations directly from original donors rather than through intermediaries, are mo-
tivated to accept those donations at least in part by their desire to maintain strong
relationships with the donors. Our survey supports this claim. In that survey, NGOs
that receive 70% or more of their in-kind donations directly from original donors
identify donor relationship as the third most important factor (see Figure 3) while
NGOs that receive less than 70% of their donations from original donors identify
donor relationship as the last consideration (see Figure 4).
2.4.3 Improving financial metrics
Donors often assess NGOs using financial metrics, especially total revenues (i.e., total
donations received) and financial efficiency [166] (i.e., the percentage of revenues
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that goes to overhead or non-program related expenses)14. An NGO’s total revenues
indicate its size and significance, while its financial efficiency indicates how well the
NGO uses the monies entrusted to it. Most NGOs in the U.S. signal their financial
efficiency through statements such as “x cents of every dollar goes directly to help
...”.
We argue that NGOs are motivated to accept in-kind donations in order to improve
financial metrics, in particular to increase revenues and improve financial efficiency.
Because of the relatively low overhead expenses associated with in-kind donations,
high value in-kind donations increase total revenues without significantly increasing
overhead costs, thereby increasing the organization’s financial efficiency. In other
words, by accepting high value in-kind donations, an NGO increases its revenues and
so its perceived importance and can use more of its cash donations for overhead ex-
penses such as fund raising, administrative salaries, etc. without reducing its financial
efficiency.
As we discussed in Section 2.3.4.1, most corporate donations are high value, high
margin products. We argue that many NGOs may accept less than appropriate high
value in-kind donations to help improve their financial metrics.
Although most of the NGO participants in our survey rank the “Financial value”
of the donation as one of the least important factors in deciding which donations to
accept, they also list “Valuation” of in-kind donations as one of the most significant
operational challenges associated with in-kind donations (see Appendix B). If the
financial value of in-kind donations is truly not important, then why does “valuation”
of those donation pose such a significant challenge? Since the donor’s valuation and
the NGO’s valuation of a donation are separate for tax purposes, NGOs can simply
attribute a low value to the donation: under-valuing a donation poses fewer risks than
14There are many definitions of financial efficiency. While they differ in details, they all generally
measure the percentage of total donations that are directly used to advance the cause, i.e., excluding
payments for fund raising activities, office expenses and administrative salaries.
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over-valuing it. Several Forbes articles [48, 47] and a 2009 report from the American
Institute of Philanthropy [15] highlight examples of NGOs over-valuing corporate in-
kind donations, specifically pharmaceutical product donations. We return to this
issue of “valuation” in Chapter 4.
2.4.4 Leveraging in-kind donations as matching grants
Many government funded projects require NGOs to contribute a certain percentage
of the total budget in the form “matching grants” from other donors. NGOs often
use corporate in-kind donations to meet these requirements while saving their cash
resources to pay for overhead and other projects. One possible motivation for an




IN-KIND DONATION DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS
3.1 Introduction
In order to prevent inappropriate in-kind donations in disaster response, it is impor-
tant to understand various sources (i.e., donor groups) and the delivery channels these
donations follow. In a recent 2012 article Holguin et al. [117] identified this topic,
which they described as the “material convergence” problem, a major gap in the hu-
manitarian logistics research. We focus on in-kind donations from private donors (i.e.
individuals and community groups, and corporate donors) in this chapter and rest of
the thesis.
For domestic disaster response, the U.S. government’s in-kind donations are tar-
geted and well-managed. For international disaster relief government in-kind dona-
tions (from all donor countries), though generally valuable but can be challenging to
coordinate and difficult to distribute efficiently. For example, according to United
Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affair’s (OCHA’s) financial tracking
services [1], after 2010 Haiti earthquake 47 countries sent in-kind donations of goods,
personnel and military assets to help the Haitian government. The proper manage-
ment of these resources are challenging, however, we do not discuss them within the
scope of this thesis.
We describe the flow of unsolicited donations in disaster relief by first identifying
the usual channels these donations follow in the non-disaster context. We use the
concept of channels to describe how in-kind donations from private donors reaches
final beneficiaries or the NGO projects that use them both in disaster and non-
disaster contexts. The literature on channels first appeared in marketing literature
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in 1950s (See Alderson [34]).The early research on marketing channels focused on
identifying various functions provided by marketing channels and explaining why
these functions were important. After the early functional approach of understanding
channels, research has focus to understand the organizations that make up the channel
and the impact of their interactions on the overall success of the channel [111].
Research in marketing channels identifies three important areas of managerial
decision that are crucial to the functioning of the channel. These are: 1. Structure
of the channel (members that make up the channel), 2. Governance of the channel
(framework that guides coordination and resolution of conflicts) and 3. Relationship
management (norms of daily interactions that shape the environment of a channel)
[38]. We primarily focused on explaining the structure of in-kind donation channels
used by NGOs and donors in this chapter.
Our main focus in this thesis is in-kind donation management in disaster relief.
To fully understand these donations and the challenges they create, we must better
understand the flow of in-kind donations in non-disaster contexts. Experiences and
expectations established in the non-disaster context shape our responses to disasters.
This chapter describes the usual or non-disaster channels for in-kind donations in
Sections 3.2 – 3.3, to establish the context in which unsolicited in-kind donations arise
when a disaster occurs. In Section 3.4, we describe the channels used by Individual
donors and business donors to send donations to NGOs in disaster relief context.
3.2 NGO operating models for managing in-kind dona-
tions
In-kind donations are not unique to disaster giving. In fact, it is a common way for
private donors to support NGOs. Every year people and companies donate nearly $
18 billion worth of products in the U.S. to NGOs working in various humanitarian
and social issues domestically and internationally. Generally, individuals and fam-
ilies donate used personal and household items, whereas companies donate mostly
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unused inventories to NGOs. In fact in-kind giving from private donors (by $ value)
has increased over time while the value of overall donations has remained relatively
constant. NGOs have created primarily two different operating models to use in-kind
donations: one is Resale, where NGOs sale donated items to convert them to cash
and the other is Direct-use model where donations are used by the recipient NGO or
their beneficiaries. In this section, we describe how NGOs use in-kind donations and
distribute them in non-disaster context.
NGOs rely on one or both of these models, employing the Resale model primarily
for individual donations and the Direct-use model for corporate donations of inven-
tories, equipment and other supplies which donors do not not allow to resale both
for tax deduction and commercial purposes. If corporate donations are resold that
would render the donation ineligible for enhanced tax deductions (according to IRC
170(e)(3), as we discussed in details in chapter 2) and would mean the goods may
appear in the commercial market at a reduced cost and compete with the company’s
own sales channels. For individual donors donating used personal and household
items to NGOs, these concerns do not apply and most NGOs therefore sell those
donations.
The difference in donor and donation type, tax laws and the other concerns (es-
pecially for business donors) have primarily divided the way NGOs use in-kind do-
nations. In most cases NGOs employing Resale model are different than the NGOs
using Direct-use model. The Resale model is more suitable for NGOs working in
various domestic issues in the U.S., such as the GoodWill Industries, American Kid-
ney Fund and others. NGOs who use Direct-use model are often more international
focused and many of them have both disaster relief and development programs.
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3.2.1 Resale
Individuals and community groups donate used personal and household items to
NGOs on a regular basis. According to the IRS report on Individual Noncash Con-
tributions, 2010 [138], 7.9 million individual tax payers (who filed form 8283) claimed
deductions of nearly $ 12 billion in 2010 for donations of used clothing, electronics
and other household items. This estimate does not include donations from millions of
tax payers who either did not claim a tax deduction or did not file form 8283 (dona-
tions less than $ 500). According to the same IRS report [138], two largest categories
of individual donation are clothing (78%) and household items (34%) for tax payers
who itemized deduction on the form 8283.
NGOs convert most individual donations of personal items, such as clothing, elec-
tronics, household items, vehicles, etc., to cash by selling them. National Resale
Professionals [148] estimates that there are over 25,000 thrift stores in the United
States, many of which are run by various local or national charities. Goodwill Indus-
tries, for example, operates nearly 2,700 retail stores across U.S. and Canada, which
generated $ 2.59 billion in sales to support social services and job training programs.
Nearly 79 million people in the U.S. and Canada donated to Goodwill Industries (ac-
cording to [26]) in 2011, which is almost 10 times higher than the number of U.S. tax
payers who submitted form 8283. Similarly, the Salvation Army’s 1350 family stores
in the U.S. generated $ 577 million in sales in 2011 [28].
Once donated for resale, NGOs employ both or either of the two mechanisms to
covert these donations to cash :
• Sale directly to customers ( through thrift stores, e-commerce websites)
• Sale it to commercial brokers
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Figure 5: Resale model to covert in-kind donations to cash
NGOs collect these donation items either by themselves ( i.e. donation collection
sites, thrift stores) or through contractors. After being collected, donated items go
through a sorting process to determine the best way to monetize the donation. The
choices are either to sale individual items through thrift stores or e-commerce or
auction websites, or sale it through commercial salvage brokers. The choice depends
on the question whether the likely selling price support the added handling costs of
running the item through a thrift shop, or is it more economical to simply sell it off
in bulk at a lower price, but with less investment. It also depends on item categories
too. For example, NGOs receive donation of used vehicles, boats and other larger
items which are not usually sold at thrift stores . These types of items are directly
sold through commercial salvage brokers. If the decision is to resale a donated item
to customers, the item goes to the NGO run thrift stores. Some for-profit thrift stores
(e.g., Savers, Unique Thrift Stores, etc.) also purchase gently used items from NGOs.
Beside the traditional brick and mortar thrift stores, many NGOs also operate
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their web based thrift stores to reach out to more customers. These web-based NGO
thrift stores sale like any other e-commerce sites with a charitable purpose. NGOs
and their individual donors can also sale used items (for donation) through on-line
auctions sites, such as e-Bay Giving Works. Online action site e-Bay Giving Works
allows people and NGOs to sell items to benefit a cause. In fact there are more than
25,000 registered charities on e-Bay Giving Works. Individual donors can donate the
full price gained from selling or a fraction of the sale (from 10 percent to 100 percent)
to a charity of their choice. Thus, e-Bay Giving Works allows more opportunities
for NGOs and their donors to sale used items. According to the e-bay Giving Works
website, e-Bay Giving Works is a partnership between e-Bay and PayPal Giving
Fund (formerly MissionFish), an IRS-registered 501 (c)(3) nonprofit organization.
Because of the non-profit stature, donated money through e-bay Giving Works are
tax deductible for the seller (or, the donor). The site (http://givingworks.ebay.com/)
has helped over 25,000 listed charities to raise more than $ 300 millions since 1999.
The site allows NGOs to bypass the usual (and often ineffective) in-kind donation
process. If donors donate their used items through e-Bay Giving Works, NGOs do not
have to physically collect, sort and sell donated items which requires investment for
logistics and store operations. However, it requires donors to spend significant time on
selling (and shipping items) on e-bay. On the other hand, donating to a NGO which
have physical donation collection sites in the community require less time investment
from the donor and gives the same benefit. From the donor motivation discussion in
chapter 2, by donating used items individual donors get warm glow benefit (social
and psychosocial benefit), free space at home by donating unused products and tax
benefits. From individual donor’s cost and benefit perspective, donating to a local
thrift store is more convenient (saves time) to donors than selling through e-Bay site.
The difference in revenue from physical thrift stores vs. e-Bay Giving Works ( $ 15
billion per year vs. a total of $ 335 millions in 14 years from 1999 to 2013) shows
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that the donors prefer NGOs to covert their used items to cash than doing it by
themselves.
Items that are overly used and are not appropriate for resale through thrift shops
in the U.S. are sold to companies that recycle used clothing and other items. Hansen
[113] estimates from 40% to 75% of donated clothing to NGOs ultimately goes to
second hand textile brokers and recyclers. According to SMART [8], a trade associa-
tion of nearly 200 textile recycling companies, recyclers discard and ultimately send
to landfills nearly 80% of donated clothing they receive. Of the remaining 20% ,
approximately 45% is sent to various developing countries around the world, mostly
in Africa, where there is a demand for second hand clothing (for details on second
hand clothing exports in Africa see [113]). Another 20% is converted to fibers for
various purposes including insulation, pillow stuffing, etc. About 30% is used as rags
or industrial cleaning cloths and the rest is discarded [147].
NGO Resale model for individual in-kind donation has been successful in the U.S.
and other developing countries as it align individual donors’ motivation with NGOs.
Donor can donate their used personal items and feel good about their donation.
The physical nature of the goods also create opportunities for volunteering both at
the collection and receiving sites, which benefits both the individuals ( who want to
volunteer) and the NGOs by providing alternative to paid labor. As the items are sold
and converted to cash, NGOs get the flexibility of using it in most fitting way. Resale
model help NGOs generate cash from items that would otherwise have ended up in
landfills. NGOs help people re-purpose their used items and support a charitable
cause in the process. The attractiveness of this model has made “donation” a default
disposal method of used personal and household items in the U.S..
In disaster response context, NGO Resale model faces an unusual problem. In-
stead of selling these items, donors want to send their used personal items to help
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the victims. Most of the NGOs responding to disaster relief does not have any es-
tablished Resale mechanism that can convert these used personal item donations to
cash. Therefore, the absence of any Resale model in disaster relief creates enormous
challenge for NGOs. We will discuss about this challenge later in the chapter in
Section 3.4.
3.2.2 Direct-use
NGOs employ Direct-use model for those in-kind donations which are intended for
direct transfer to beneficiaries or NGO use, and not eligible for any commercial sale.
Almost all corporate and government in-kind donations and some part of individual
donations fall in this category. Most corporate in-kind donors donate their inventory
to NGOs for distribution to final beneficiaries or their own use. Direct-use model
ensures donors that the donated items will not affect the sale of the same or similar
products in the commercial channel, or risk their brand reputation. The donated
products are not supervised by the company after the donation and therefore company
cannot guarantee the quality of the product. This can harm donor’s brand reputation
if donated items are sold in inappropriate condition in secondary market. In many
cases donor companies require NGOs to distribute their donated products outside
the countries where they have commercial operations and therefore, many corporate
donations are distributed outside the U.S. (see appendix A for NGO survey result).
This “non-sale” agreement is also a part of enhanced tax eligibility for corporate
donors in the U.S..
Beside the corporate donations, individual donors also donate in-kind to NGOs for
direct use, especially to food banks and local community organizations (e.g. home-
less shelters). These donations are intended to benefit the final beneficiary directly.
Individual donors often organize food drives, coat drives or collect personal hygiene
items for shelters. These type of individual donations are not motivated by donor’s
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business interest or tax law. In our discussion of donor motivations for in-kind giv-
ing, we discussed studies showing individual giving can be paternalistic in nature and
people might receive higher “warm glow” by donating tangible items.
Donating in-kind in disaster relief is another example when individual donors
and community groups prefer Direct-use model for their donation. Our primary
motivation in this chapter is to understand how NGOs manage and distribute in-kind
donations in non-disaster contexts to explain NGO challenges with in-kind donations
in disaster relief. Therefore, in the following section (Section 3.3) we further explore
the use of Direct-use model in non-disaster context.
3.3 Distribution channels for Direct-use model
We distinguish two pathways or channels Direct-use in-kind donations can follow:
Direct-distribution and Pass-through distribution. The choice of distribution channel
for in kind donations varies based on the context, mostly based on the appropriateness
of the donation and the strength of the relationship between the original donor and the
NGO. Direct-distribution is the appropriate channel when the relationship is strong
and the donated products are aligned with the NGO’s mission. Otherwise, donations
tend to move through the Pass-through channel. Number of NGOs a donation passes
through before it reaches the End-use NGO depends on the donation type and the
context of giving.
3.3.1 Direct-distribution
The Direct-distribution channel, in which the Original donor donates directly to the
End-use organization, as illustrated in Figure 6, is the simplest pathway for the dis-
tribution of in-kind donations. Corporate gifts to strategic NGO partners typically
move through direct-distribution. For example, Proctor and Gamble donate their
water purifier packets “PUR” in international disaster relief through their NGO part-
ners. For targeted donations of company products, most companies use this model.
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Direct distribution is not limited to disaster relief, companies also donate products
and services in a similar way in non-disaster contexts. Many pharmaceutical com-
panies (e.g. Pfizer, Merck and others) donate drugs for disease specific treatments
in developing countries through partner NGOs. The simple community donation of
food or personal hygiene products to a local shelter also follows the same model.
Direct-distribution model helps NGOs and corporate donors establish long term
partnerships and is the most suitable delivery model for strategic giving. The close
proximity of the Original donor and the End-use NGO is critical for ensuring social
impact. For corporate donor perspective, Direct-distribution channel provides more
visibility of their donations ( for donated products), helps to integrate product giving
with other form of in-king giving, such as employee volunteering, pro-bono services
etc. From our earlier discussion corporate giving motivations in chapter 2, companies
increasingly want to engage their employees with the company philanthropic efforts
to improve employee morale and loyalty. This is the only model that allows employee
volunteering or other in-kind service donations to NGOs in a meaningful way.
However, the Direct-distribution model is challenged by the scale of operations,
especially for companies who want to donate products in large quantities (mostly
from surplus inventories). Most NGOs have limited resources and physical capacity
to absorb large scale corporate giving of specific products. For example, it is hard
for a local shelter to receive truck-load of toothbrushes from a company. They have
neither the capacity to store them nor the number of beneficiaries required to consume
them in a reasonable time frame. Giving more toothbrushes than the personal need
to each beneficiary only encourages their commercial sale in the secondary market,
which is risky for the donor and for the NGO.
Direct-distribution also requires perfect alignment between the donor’s gift and the
NGO need, which can be difficult to achieve when donating surplus inventories. Many
products are only relevant to the exempt purpose of a small number of specialized
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NGOs. Therefore it is not only physical (logistics) capacity to handle the product
but whether the recipient NGO’s scope of the operations can absorb them effectively.
The restrictive nature of the in-kind giving results in these operational challenges for
NGOs, which we will discuss later in this chapter. The Pass-through channel helps
solve this problem, but passing donations from one NGO to another, but it has its
own limitations and challenges. We discuss them in Section 3.3.2.
Figure 6: Direct-distribution channel
3.3.2 Pass-through Distribution
In the Pass-through distribution channel, donations flow through multiple NGOs be-
fore reaching the End-use NGO. It helps NGOs to share donations with others and
therefore accept large quantity donations of specific products from companies. The
sharing helps to match the NGO operating scale with commercial operations. In our
2012 survey of 34 NGO professionals (from 30 NGOs ) which collectively manage over
$1.5 billion worth of annual in-kind donations, respondents indicated that nearly 30%
of the donations came from other NGOs (i.e., intermediary organizations). To facil-
itate donation matching and alleviate the scale issue, many NGOs have established
themselves as intermediary organization who act as “clearing house” for donors and
NGOs. We describe this organizations as Aggregators. They play an important role
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in the pass-through distribution channel. We describe their roles in the Pass-through
channel and operating model in the following paragraphs.
3.3.2.1 Aggregator:
An Aggregator is an Intermediary that distributes donations to a large number of
usually smaller End-use NGOs and other Intermediaries. An Aggregator acts like
a wholesaler for donated items, helping donors distribute larger donations among a
large pool of usually smaller NGOs and helping smaller NGOs access the gifts of large
donors. Figure 7 illustrates an aggregator’s role in the Pass-through channel.
Figure 7: Donation Aggregator and Pass-through channel
Aggregator NGOs generally have the logistics capacity, e.g., trucks, warehouses
and volunteers, to handle a large volume of donations. They offer donors an easy
way to make bulk product donation and offer End-use NGOs a convenient place to
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find the in-kind donations they need. Food banks in the U.S., perhaps the first large
scale aggregators, are an excellent example. Individuals, manufacturers and grocery
retailers regularly donate food to the food banks, which sort, store and distribute the
donations to various End-use organizations such as local shelters, food pantries and
soup kitchens. The End-use organizations pay a nominal fee, just a small fraction of
the wholesale price of the items, to help cover the food bank’s operating expenses.
The concept of food bank started in 1967 by a soup kitchen volunteer and busi-
nessman, John Hengel, who solicited help from the local grocery stores, asking them
to donate surplus food rather than dumping it. Hengel established St. Mary’s food
banks in Phoenix, Arizona and its operations grew and eventually spread to other
states ( for the historical evolution of food bank network in the U.S. see [83]). From
the very beginning, food banks were created to alleviate hunger in the local com-
munity by supplying donated foods to local food pantries and soup kitchens. Today,
over 200 food banks in the U.S. work with the national umbrella organization, Feeding
America, to coordinate their activities and effectively solicit donations from national
food manufacturers and grocery retailers. Feeding America in effect an it Aggregator
for Aggregators. Therefore, the aggregation can happen at different level and scale.
The role of umbrella organization is to facilitate the donation process and coordinate
among their members. These type of organizations does not physically receive or
manage donations which happens at the food bank level ( lower level aggregation).
Following a similar model and, like the food banks, focusing on one industry
or cause, Medical Supply Recovery Organizations or MSRO NGOs recover surplus
medical supplies from hospitals, manufacturers and distributors and donate them
to non-profit clinics and hospitals internationally. Medshare, for example, collects
medical supplies from hospitals, and medical supplier companies and distributes them
to non-profit clinics and hospitals around the world. Other NGOs such as Americare
and Map International act as Aggregators for surplus medicines from pharmaceutical
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companies. Similarly, Techsoup acts as an Aggregator for technology companies’
donations of products and services.
3.3.2.2 Distribution mechanism in Pass-through channel
General purpose Aggregator NGOs such as Good360, NAEIR ,Waste to Charity and
others, do not focus on any specific industry or cause. They collect donations from
various industries and donors and in turn offer them to their member NGOs. Be-
cause of their general nature, they receive large volume of donations from various
industries and companies. According to Good360’s annual report [29], the organiza-
tion distributed approximately 6500 truckload equivalents of products to over 30,000
charities in the U.S. and 28 other countries between January, 2011 and December,
2012. Donated products included specialty mattresses, technology products, toys and
other merchandise, miscellaneous paper and personal care items, pet food and other
pet care products, etc.
From operations standpoint, most of the Aggregators have similar model. However,
they differ significantly with respect their mission orientation. Food banks support a
specific cause and they share the same mission with their member NGOs, i.e. local
soup kitchens and food pantries. Because of their mission commitment, they measure
their impact through not only the amount of food distributed but the advance they
made in resolving domestic hunger in the U.S.. For other Aggegators (both industry
specific or general purpose), there is no shared mission, they support their member
NGOs to receive donations from corporate donors. This distinction is important for
ensuring programmatic impact.
The Aggegators with the Pass-through channel facilitate corporate donors to
donate more easily without the any operational difficulty. This channel creates an
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alternative for disposal of surplus inventories for companies. A 2013 article [178] out-
lines the benefits companies can receive from donation surplus inventories to a qual-
ified Gifts in Kind (GIK) organizations ( general purpose aggegator NGO). Beside
enhanced tax benefits, companies can save on operational expenses (storage), reduce
the risk of market cannibalization from liquidated products and receive publicity from
their philanthropic efforts. We have discussed all these benefits in corporate donor
motivations in Chapter 2. The Aggregator NGO create an efficient outlet for com-
panies to donate inventories without having to worry about the details management
and distribution of their donations.
Aggregator NGOs and many corporate donors rely on the Pass-through channel
to distribute donated products. At the time of donation, Aggegator NGOs receive
donations from donors without specifically identifying the End-use NGO(s). The
underlying assumption is, a donation will eventually find an appropriate —End-use
NGO if it is passed along from one NGO to other. In each step of sharing, the donation
will get closer to the type of organization that can use it. Many corporations donate
products with the restriction that they can only be distributed outside the U.S..
Pass-through channel helps to distribute these corporate donations internationally.
3.3.2.3 Incentives
There are primarily two incentives that help donations move in the it Pass-through
channel. One is the revenue motivation for the receiving NGO and the other is
the service fees that Intermediary NGOs charge for connecting the donor and the
recipient NGO. In many cases, NGOs which pass donations to other NGOs also
record the financial value of the donation as their revenue. Recording donations in
such way, inflates NGO revenue and reduces the % (of total revenue) overhead cost
for NGOs. We have discussed NGO motivations for inflating revenue in chapter 2
in details. Pass-through channel allows participating NGOs to record the monetary
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value of donations which passes through them.
AERDO GIK guidelines [14] recognize this practice and the potential of misuse.
Many NGOs might inflate their revenue by entering in the “pass-through” channel on
paper. Sometimes motivated NGOs are willing to pay service fees to their upstream
NGOs to receive high value in-kind donations. The NGO survey also indicated that
nearly 50% of donations from other NGOs were purchased (i.e. received) with service
fees. From operations stand point, NGOs may treat services fees as a “price” to
record the donation revenue. AERDO Gifts-in-Kind guidelines [14] suggest their
members not to charge services fees based on the $ value of the donation, which can
be interpreted as “sales”, and will violate the non-sale agreement with the original
donor. The guideline also suggests that only the End-use NGO and the NGOs who
receive the donation from the Original donor should report the revenue to avoid
possible misuse of donation reporting. An Intermediary can only record the revenue if
it can add significant value by improving the quality of the GIK, providing temporary
storage and transportation does not qualify as improving the quality of the donation.
The revenue incentive motivates many medium to smaller NGOs to participate
in the Pass-through channel for donated product distribution which is helpful from
donor’s perspective but can induce wrong incentives and distort the competition
among NGOs for donor funding. NGOs participating in Pass-through donation chan-
nel for inflating their revenue might look much bigger and more efficient (less over-
head) than others based on their financial report. In chapter 2 on donor motivations,
we discussed that there are empirical evidences that individual donors donate more
to NGOs with higher perceived efficacy. NGO financial reports and overhead ratios
are often used by individual donors to assess NGO efficacy. Revenue incentives in the
Pass-through channel can therefore be used by NGOs to “trick” the donor to receive
more donations.
In this section, we described various Direct-use distribution channels that donors
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and NGOs use to distibute in-kind donations in non-disaster context. The under-
standing of the NGO operating models (Resale vs. Direct-use) and the channels of
distribution for Direct-use in-kind donations helps us to understand the context of
how NGOs are organized to utilize in-kind donations. In Section 3.4 we describe the
channels used by various donor groups to send in-kind donations to disaster relief
both international and domestic disaster response.
3.4 In-kind donation channels in disaster response
In-kind donations in disaster response come from the same donor groups as in non-
disaster context, however, the channels used are sometimes different from their reg-
ular distribution channels. In this section, we describe the channels used by these
donors (individuals and companies) in disaster response to contrast them with their
non-disaster channels and discuss the differences to understand NGO challenges in
managing them.
3.4.1 Individuals and small group donors:
In large scale national and international disaster responses, the major source of unso-
licited and mostly inappropriate donations come from individuals and small commu-
nity group donors. Most of these donors regularly donate in-kind (e.g. used personal
and household items) to NGOs, such as the Salvation Army, Goodwill Industries and
others. After a disaster response they want to donate similar items to help disaster
victims.
From our earlier discussion on donor motivations in Chapter 2, we discussed that
individuals may receive higher “warm glow” benefits from participating in various
donation collection and volunteering events, especially after a major disaster when
emotional requirements are higher to help the victims through some types of physical
engagements. Research in psychology [149] shows that people are willing to endure
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physical discomfort for causes that relates to human sufferings ( helping disaster vic-
tims), the call it “The Martyrdom Effect”. These motivations lead many community
groups to organize their own donation collective events where people bring in their
used personal items (clothing, shoes etc.) and basic supplies such as bottled water,
diapers, hygiene items etc.
Recognized disaster relief organization who directly distribute donations to victims
such as the American Red Cross and others do not accept such unsolicited donations
of personal items from these small community groups. The sorting and processing
required for these types of donations are not productive for NGOs and therefore, they
just solicit monetary donations from individual donors. Unable to find an NGO to
accept the donations, these groups often organize their own transportation and send
these donations directly to the disaster area in the hope some local organizations will
be able to use them.
From channel perspective, there are two distinctive differences in disaster relief
that create challenges for both the donors and NGOs. First, there is no identified
Resale channel for donors that can turn donated clothing to cash for disaster relief
operations. The organizations who receive used personal items in non-disaster context
(Goodwill Industries, Salvation Army) do not support disaster relief through their
thrift store revenues. Secondly, personal item donations are pushed to the disaster
site without any defined distribution channel. In many circumstance, the trucks full
of donated clothing and other items just drop their cargo at the disaster site if they
can’t find any interested local organizations. This challenge is similar in international
relief operations too. Donor groups often send ocean container full their collected
donations consigned to “ the people of the affected country”. The lack of any defined
Direct-use channel in disaster relief for individual donors makes in-kind giving in
disaster relief unproductive exercise both for the donor and NGOs.
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3.4.2 Business donors:
Many businesses offer in-kind donations of products and services to NGOs in disaster
response. We discussed about Proctor & Gamble donating PUR water purifying
packets and other personal hygiene and cleaning products in disaster relief in Chapter
2 as targeted donations. In a large scale disaster response, businesses of various sizes
(from local businesses to national and multinational companies such as P&G) donate
products to NGOs participating in disaster relief. For larger corporations, who have
regular in-kind giving programs domestically or internationally, disaster giving is
relatively easier as they donate through their regular NGO partners.
However, the existing relationship can be both a blessing and a challenge in dis-
aster giving for many NGOs. If the donation offers are appropriate for the recipient’s
response and distribution capacity, it flows easily through the Direct -distribution
channel. However, if the donations are not appropriate for the recipient NGO’s re-
sponse, the challenge begins on how to use or redistribute the donations without
staining their donor relationship. Many NGOs do not refuse donations from their
corporate partners for the risk of loosing them. However, they also need to find ap-
propriate programs or other NGOs to distribute donated products from their partners
which they can’t use. Therefore, many donations from established partners can also
enter in the Pass-through channel if the primary recipient can’t use them effectively.
Corporate donations of surplus inventories are generally managed by Aggrega-
tor NGOs in non-disaster context and it flows through Pass-through channel to an
End-use NGO. Similar model is difficult to implement in disaster relief with surplus
inventories. In a time pressing and volatile situation, it is difficult for Aggregators
or donors to find a suitable End-use NGO to donate a specific products unless it
matches their need. The only revenue motivations may not work in disaster relief
context for relief NGOs as their main priority is to help the victims after the disaster.
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Sometimes many companies and Aggregators make opportunistic donations in dis-
aster relief by organizing their own transport and sending their donated items directly
to the disaster site without identifying any suitable disaster relief NGO partner be-
fore the shipment. Many local community organizations and hospitals become the
End-use NGO for these donations who are often inexperienced in disaster relief and
too polite to say “NO” to outside donors. Therefore, distribution channels in disaster
relief remain same as non-disaster channel for corporate donations, but donors and
Aggregators may sometime push unwanted donations in a pass-through channel which
are made of different NGOs than their usual channel.
3.5 Conclusion:
In this chapter, we discuss various channels donors and NGOs use to distribute in-
kind donations. The distribution channels for in-kind donations used by NGOs can
vary based on the context of use, i.e. whether they are used for disaster relief or long
term development projects. Most of the challenges faced by NGOs managing in-kind
donations are related to the channels they use for distribution. We use our definitions
of various NGO roles and the channels from this chapter to describe the challenges
NGOs face with in-kind donations. In a disaster relief context these challenges man-
ifest themselves at a higher intensity and causes inefficiency and delays in the relief
operation. We discuss detail about these challenges and their impacts on the overall
relief supply chain in Chapter 4. We also use the channel description in this chapter
as a basis for an comprehensive framework that we offer in Chapter 5 to develop our
understanding of the problem.
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CHAPTER IV
DONOR AND NGO CHALLENGES IN MANAGING
IN-KIND DONATIONS
4.1 Introduction
Improving disaster relief operations has been the key focus of humanitarian logistics
research over the last decade. Among many other challenges in disaster relief, efficient
management of in-kind donations is significant. Unmanaged and often unsolicited in-
kind donations have been identified in the humanitarian logistics literature [192, 106,
117, 45] as one of the main challenges for relief workers in disaster response operations.
Unsolicited in-kind donation pose a system wide problem for disaster response as they
consume valuable resources and slow the overall response [183].
In this chapter we describe the effects of inappropriate donations on overall relief
operations. Inappropriate donations consume the time and energy of busy emergency
personnel and block the flow of needed supplies by occupying limited storage and
transportation capacity in the disaster area [183]. Numerous articles in the humani-
tarian logistics literature [183, 120, 85, 45, 106] document the impact of the second
disaster.
To fully understand these donations and the challenges they create, we must bet-
ter understand the flow of in-kind donations in non-disaster contexts. Experiences
and expectations established in non-disaster contexts shape our responses to disas-
ters. The differences between in-kind donation channels in disaster and non-disaster
contexts engender systemic challenges that often turn in-kind donations in disaster
response into a disaster all their own, “the second disaster”. We describe the ef-
fects of the second disaster on overall disaster relief operations in Section 4.2. This
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chapter provides a comprehensive view of challenges various entities face with in-kind
donations to help understand the making of “the second disaster”. In Chapter 5,
we translate this comprehensive view into a comprehensive framework to address the
second disaster in a systematic way.
4.2 The second disaster
Inappropriate in-kind donations pose serious threats to relief efforts. The challenge
is often so severe that it is referred to as “the second disaster” in the NGO commu-
nity. The term “the second tier disaster” was used in a 2002 Newsweek magazine
article[101] describing the masses of unsolicited donations (with an estimated value
of $75 million) that piled up in relief agencies’ warehouses in New York City and
adjacent areas after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. Other news articles
[98, 96] have used the term “the second disaster” to describe the “disaster” for relief
workers who have to manage the masses of unsolicited donations after a disaster.
Holgúın-Veras et al. [121] suggest that nearly 60% of material donations made to the
Hurricane Katrina and Haiti earthquake responses can be classified as inappropriate
donations.
Managing unsolicited in-kind donations in a post-disaster context is considered
one of the most critical challenges for NGOs and relief workers. In interviews with
Holgúın-Veras et al. [117] logisticians involved in the 2010 Haiti earthquake response
unanimously agreed that unsolicited donations were the most difficult barrier for
effective response. In the same article, Holgúın-Veras et al. suggest that the man-
agement of unsolicited in-kind donations in disaster response has not significantly
improved since 1957, when it was identified in the disaster literature as the “material
convergence” problem [104]. Since the 2004 Asian Tsunami response, many articles
in the humanitarian logistics literature [192, 133, 120, 45, 183, 85] have pointed to
unsolicited and therefore unmanaged in-kind donations as one of the main challenges
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for effective response. Most of these articles discuss the implications of unsolicited
in-kind donations in the disaster relief supply chain, especially in the areas of lo-
gistics resource management, supply management and disposal. We describe these
challenges in sections 4.2.1 – 4.2.4.
4.2.1 Logistics
Unsolicited in-kind donations pose severe logistics challenges for large scale interna-
tional relief operations. These donations often accumulate for months on the airport
tarmac or in the port areas of the affected country as no NGO wants them or has
the manpower to sort through them to identify the supplies they do want. During
the 2004 Asian Tsunami response, the accumulation of unusable donations blocked
incoming relief supplies and almost closed down Sri Lanka’s Colombo International
Airport completely [183]. Low-priority or unwanted items often block the flow of
other important supplies in the early stage of disaster relief by occupying limited
storage and consuming limited transportation capacity [119]. Donated materials in
international disaster relief are often held by local customs for long periods as they
lack proper documentation and permits, which many NGOs and their donors fail to
provide. Coordinating with customs officials, overseas donors, clearing agents, etc.
for these donations creates extra work for NGO staff – efforts that, in most cases,
yield no useful results because, in the end, the donations are either inappropriate for
the response at all or ultimately arrive too late to be useful.
Similarly, for domestic disaster response in the U.S., unsolicited donations over-
whelm local volunteers and NGO staffs [162, 96]. In many cases these donations are
left out in the open for days as NGOs struggle to find suitable storage areas for them
[120]. Relief workers and logisticians on the ground spend a significant portion of
their time managing these donations even though they usually prove useless or even
counterproductive in the end.
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Researchers estimate that in the Asian Tsunami in 2004 [115], Hurricane Ka-
trina in 2005 [120], the Haiti earthquake in 2010 [119] and the Japan earthquake
and tsunami in 2011[121], between 50% and 70% of the materials transported and
managed by logisticians for disaster relief was not useful at all.
By consuming limited resources, inappropriate donations ultimately slow the over-
all response and extend victims’ suffering. Media reports of the slow response and
victims’ suffering brings more unsolicited donations and causes further delays. Besiou
et al. [141] illustrate this media effect on unsolicited donations through a causal loop
diagram in their 2011 paper.
4.2.2 Supply uncertainly and lack of visibility
In a review of humanitarian logistics operations, Kovács et al. [133] discuss the chal-
lenges of managing unsolicited and solicited supplies from various donors. Even do-
nations of necessary relief supplies (e.g., medicines, food and other items) can be
difficult to manage in international disaster relief. A Financial Times article [145]
discusses examples of how language differences and a lack of standardized labeling
created problems during the 2004 Asian Tsunami response. The lack of visibility of
these donations often contributes to undersupply or oversupply of relief items, causing
coordination challenges for relief activities [45]. Holgúın-Veras et al. [117] describe
the oversupply of blankets in Japan after the 2011 tsunami and bottled water in Haiti
after the 2010 earthquake.
Unsolicited donations are often sent to relief organizations without any prior con-
sent or notification. In the immediate aftermath of hurricane Katrina in 2005, trucks
filled with unsolicited donations, mostly used clothing and other household items,
unloaded their cargos in front of NGO shelters and staging areas and drove away
leaving relief workers to sort out the mess [120]. More recently, the Associated Press
and NPR [144, 97] reported cases of local donation drives organized by well-meaning
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individuals and ad-hoc relief groups after Superstorm Sandy. Many of these donations
simply arrived at the disaster site without any prior arrangement with relief agencies.
Even when donations are appropriate, this lack of visibility can create havoc for relief
operations.
4.2.3 Unproductive use of NGO staff and volunteer time
Sorting through mixed supplies of donated products like those left after hurricane
Katrina often proves frustrating and time consuming as the vast majority of the do-
nated goods are inappropriate at best and useless at worst. During disaster response,
donated materials are often stored in make-shift warehouses, which, given the limited
resources and dynamic and ad hoc nature of the response, are rarely well-organized.
NGO staff and volunteers spend hundreds of hours sorting through them. An Asso-
ciate Press article [162] describes the frustrating conditions and challenges of “junk
donations” in a local warehouse after the 2011 tornadoes in Tuscaloosa, Alabama,
where “donated toys were piled 6 feet high as volunteers sort through hundreds of
bags of old clothes”.
4.2.4 Disposal of unwanted donations
Because warehouses and other shelters are often in short supply, donations of used
clothing and household items that cannot be productively used are often left out in
the elements. Salvage brokers are unwilling to except soaked and muddy masses of
used clothing and sending them to landfills is costly and can damage a relief agency’s
reputation. Discarding corporate donations can be even more difficult as many items
such as expired pharmaceuticals or other medical items require orderly disposal.
A study of inappropriate drug donations [190] in international disaster relief sug-
gests that in the 2004 Tsunami response as much 70% (as in Aceh, Indonesia) to
80% (as in Sri Lanka) of donated drugs were inappropriate. Most of these inappro-
priate medicines were ultimately incinerated. Government regulations often prevent
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re-exporting donations that have been imported for disaster relief and so many NGOs
find they have no alternative but to pay for disposal of inappropriate donations re-
ceived during the disaster response.
Disposal of unwanted in-kind donations is a difficult challenge for NGOs from
logistical, financial and donor relationship perspectives. Since 3rd party companies
that offer certified disposal services are rare in developing countries, NGOs often find
they must organize the disposal process themselves. Disposal is even more challenging
for specialty items such as expired pharmaceuticals, which require orderly disposal in
accordance with local laws or the donor company’s guidelines [115].
Disposal also poses risks for the NGO’s reputation, leading some NGOs to store
unuseable donated products for years. For example, a major U.S. underwear manufac-
turer donated 10 forty foot ocean containers filled with assorted new undergarments
to an international NGO for use in the response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. While
much of the clothing was helpful, many were too large for Haitian people. The NGO
faced both internal and external challenges in attempting to re-export the over sized
clothing. The NGO’s Haitian office did not want to approach the Haitian government
about re-exporting the oversized underwear for fear of the bad press and damage to
the organization’s reputation that might cause locally. After holding the underwear
for over a year, the NGO finally donated them to another local organization, which
cut them up to make quilts.
4.3 NGO operational challenges with in-kind donations
In this section, we describe common NGO operational challenges with corporate in-
kind donations. In our 2012 NGO survey, respondents were asked to “rank the follow-
ing challenges as it applies to your organization”. Table 3 shows the list of challenges
and their overall rankings.
We further breakdown the rankings of these challenges based characteristics of
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# Challenge Average Rank
1 Getting appropriate products for programs 1.74
2 Custom clearance for international donations 3.94
3 Visibility of donation and donor reporting 4.00
4 Transportation and storage in recipient countries for international
donations
4.03
5 Valuation of the donated items 4.06
6 Lack of logistics infrastructure to collect and deliver donated prod-
ucts
5.12
7 Saying “NO” to important donors for inappropriate donations 5.12
Table 3: Ranked list of challenges with average ranks (on a scale of 1 to 7 with 1
being the highest rank)
the NGO (e.g., size, role as Intermediary or End-use NGO, etc., see Appendix B).
In this section we describe each of these challenges in detail. We also discuss the
relative importance of these challenges based on the channels NGOs use to acquire
and distribute in-kind donations.
4.3.1 Getting appropriate products for programs
The challenge of “Getting appropriate products for programs” refers to the fact that
most in-kind donations are not donated based on NGO needs. Instead donors offer
what they have. NGOs struggle to match these donation offers with programmatic
needs. Getting appropriate items is the most important challenge for both End-use
and Intermediary NGOs irrespective of their size or the source of their donations (see
Appendix B for breakdowns of the rankings based on NGO characteristics).
Most of the in-kind donations that NGOs accept for international disaster relief
are either government donations, which are by and large targeted and appropriate
and surplus inventory donations from corporations. Matching surplus inventory do-
nations with NGO needs is difficult in international disaster relief contexts. Donated
items frequently do not suit the local climate, culture, infrastructure or demographics
of the affected region. Even seemingly appropriate items, such as canned food, blan-
kets or winter clothing can prove inappropriate if they are not well suited to the local
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conditions or fail to meet international relief standards (e.g., the SPHERE standards
[157]). Fleece blankets, for example, may seem like an ideal product for donation to
disaster relief, but often prove to be inappropriate or at best of questionable value in
international disaster relief as they are highly flammable and can have tragic conse-
quences in temporary shelters (tents) where open fires are frequently used for lighting
and cooking.
Because of the specific nature of the need, most in-kind donations in disaster
response prove inappropriate. For a wealth of information on inappropriate in-kind
donations in international relief and development, see the web-blog “Good intentions
are not enough” (www.goodintents.org) or the Center for International Disaster In-
formation’s (CIDI) website (www.cidi.org).
Intermediaries End-use NGOs
1. Getting Appropriate products for pro-
grams
1. Getting Appropriate products for pro-
grams
2. Custom clearance for international do-
nations
2. Valuation of donated items
3. Visibility of donation and donor report-
ing:
3. Visibility of donation and donor report-
ing
4. Transportation and storage in recipient
countries for international donations
4. Transportation and storage in recipient
countries for international donations
5. Valuation of donated items 5. Custom clearance for international do-
nations
6. Lack of logistics infrastructure to col-
lect and deliver donated products
6. Saying “NO” to important donors for
inappropriate donations
7. Saying “NO” to important donors for
inappropriate donations
7. Lack of logistics infrastructure to col-
lect and deliver donated products
Table 4: Ranked list of challenges for Intermediaries and End-use NGOs
4.3.2 Customs clearance in international shipping
We discuss the delayed custom clearance process for in-kind donations in disaster
relief in Section 4.2.1. As the survey suggests, it is a significant challenge even in non-
disaster contexts. Most donations are sent to developing countries, where customs
clearance processes can be slow and corruption can be endemic. Because NGOs do not
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receive a steady flow of donations of similar items or send them to the same countries
frequently and repreatedly, NGO staff, who are typically not trained logisticians,
are unfamiliar with recipient countries’ import policies for donated goods and the
requirements for supporting documents.
Table 4 shows that customs clearance in international shipping is the second most
important operational challenge for Intermediary NGOs whereas it is the fifth most
important challenge for End-use NGOs. Donated items shipped internationally are
often held at customs as they lack proper documentation or certification, which only
the manufacturer or distributor can provide. The different rankings in Table 4 suggest
that End-use NGOs have less trouble with donors in the Direct-distribution channel
and, in the Pass-through channel, are pushing the problem back on the Intermediary
NGOs to resolve.
4.3.3 Visibility of donation and donor reporting
Visibility of the donation refers to the availability of up-to-date information about
where the donations are and how they are used. Most corporate donors require some
form of reporting (often in the form of beneficiary stories or distribution reports)
about the disposition of donations. Donation visibility is important for donors both
for understanding the programmatic impact and for monitoring the risks from im-
proper use.
The Pass-through channel poses significant risks for the donor as it provides less
visibility. Although NGOs participating in the Pass-through channel are responsible
for using donations in accordance with their tax exempt purpose and donors’ guide-
lines, any misuse can harm the donor’s reputation and donated products that end up
in secondary markets can cannibalize sales.
The Direct-distribution channel provides greater visibility. Nevertheless, many
NGOs struggle to meet and manage donors’ reporting requirements. While most
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NGOs provide impact stories and distribution reports to larger donors, producing
separate reports for each corporate donor can strain the capacities of NGO staff and
their limited reporting systems.
4.3.4 Transportation and storage in recipient countries for international
donations
Last mile logistics is a recognized challenge for international NGOs both in disas-
ter and non-disaster contexts. The lack of commercial infrastructure and standard
logistics services in recipient countries, especially in times of crisis, complicates lo-
gistics operations. Many NGOs fail to plan appropriately for the inevitable extra
logistics costs associated with in-kind donations while accepting donations and so
face challenges later.
Last mile distribution is especially challenging in large scale disaster response
when the local infrastructure is fully or partially destroyed. Holgúın-Veras et al. [119]
describe the the truck shortages NGOs faced in Haiti and the Dominican Republic
during relief operations after the 2010 earthquake and with many buildings damaged
by the earthquake, storage facilities were hard to find. After the 2004 Asian Tsunami,
roads destroyed by the tsunami waves left many severely affected communities in
Indonesian coastal areas inaccessible.
4.3.5 Valuation
Table 4 ranks valuation as the second most important challenge for End-use NGOs.
Valuation refers to the question of how to determine an appropriate “fair market
value” for a donation. The current accounting standards (from GAP and FASB) and
IRS guidelines do not dictate a single method for determining fair market value and
so different NGOs can record different “fair market values” for the same donation
based on the methods they use.
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The lack of standards complicates the valuation of in-kind donations such as phar-
maceuticals. NGOs often rely on the values suggested by donors who, for tax and
other reasons, have an incentive to report higher values. A 2011 Forbes article [48]
cites specific examples of how at least a dozen of the largest charities in the U.S.
(based on Forbes’ list of the top 200 charities) overvalued donations of deworming
pills. Many charities valued the pills (mainly mebendazole and albendazole) as high
as $16.25 per pill while the author claims that they are available from generic manu-
facturers at a cost of $0.02 per pill.
Table 4 also shows that End-use NGOs are much more concerned than Intermedi-
aries about valuation. We argue in Chapter 2 that some NGOs use in-kind donations
to improve financial metrics and this applies especially to End-use NGOs as Inter-
mediaries already enjoy the benefits of in-kind donations as part of their operating
model. The importance of valuation to End-use NGOs suggests that valuation can
influence decisions about which in-kind donations to accept, an issue we discuss at
greater length in Chapter 6.
4.3.6 Lack of logistics infrastructure to collect and deliver donated prod-
ucts
NGOs that work directly with donors must be able to handle large donations, pick
them up on short notice, sort them, etc. Smaller NGOs that do not have these
resources can work with Aggegator NGOs that provide logistics capacity such as
large warehouses, trucks, access to volunteers for sorting and packing, etc.
We already discussed the challenge of “saying NO to donors for inappropriate
donations” in Chapter 2. In Section 4.4, we describe systemic challenges in the
management of in-kind donations in disaster relief.
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4.4 Systemic challenges with in-kind donations in disaster
response
Our discussion in Chapter 3 of in-kind channels in disaster and non-disaster contexts
highlights systemic challenges that complicate the flow and management of in-kind
donations in disaster relief.
4.4.1 Diversion of in-kind donations from non-disaster to disaster relief
After a well-publicized, large scale disaster, goods that would normally be donated to
the Resale channel are diverted to the disaster response even though no disaster relief
channel is equipped to handle them and corporate donations of surplus inventories,
which would otherwise go to various NGO development projects or perhaps would
not have been donated at all, are suddenly donated to the disaster response. We refer
to this phenomenon as “channel diversion” (illustrated in Figure 8).
We argue that expectations set by the Resale channel in non-disaster contexts
indirectly promote the donation of used personal items in disaster relief. As we discuss
in Chapter 2, media coverage of the devastation and stories of human suffering create
a strong urge for people to do something for the victims. This phenomenon in which
large scale, well-publicized disasters attract considerably more funding than persistent
social causes is described as “the crisis mentality” of donors [91].
Many community and religious groups that organize in-kind donation drives to
support local charities respond to a large scale disaster by organizing similar drives
to collect relief supplies and personal items only to find that the Resale channel
that so effectively manages these donations in non-disaster contexts does not exist
in the disaster relief context. Left with no formal channel to support them, these
groups find ways to send their donations directly to the disaster area. This sudden
diversion of used personal items from the usual Resale channel to disaster relief causes
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Figure 8: Channel Diversion of In-kind Donations in Disaster Relief
severe problems for disaster relief NGOs, which are neither equipped to convert these
donations into cash nor able to use them for relief operations.
Similarly, companies that donate in-kind regularly, recognizing that donations
to disaster response are more visible and provide more compelling opportunities for
employee engagement, often redirect their donations to disaster relief. This channel
diversion contributes to many of the challenges listed in Table 3 and discussed in
sections 4.2.1 – 4.2.4.
4.4.2 Misaligned incentives
Corporate in-kind donations qualify for enhanced tax benefits regardless of the context
of giving or the appropriateness of the gift as long as they satisfy IRS tax code
170(e)(3) requirements. The IRS requirements assume NGOs only accept appropriate
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donations: if an NGO accepts a donation, it must be useful for the organization’s
charitable purpose. But, as we discussed in Chapter 2 and pursue again in Chapter 6,
NGOs decide which in-kind donations to accept based not only on the appropriateness
of the goods, but also on the value of the goods and the relationship with the donor. As
a consequence, NGOs accept donations of low-priority and perhaps even inappropriate
goods that have a high “fair market value” or that come from an important donor.
According to CECP 2013 giving report [30], 88% of the total giving (by market
value) from pharmaceutical companies is donated in-kind in the form of products and
72% of the total corporate non-cash giving (by market value) comes from pharma-
ceutical companies. Although many pharmaceutical product donations are life saving
and have considerable social impact, not all donations have similar impacts and they
can be accepted by NGOs for reasons other than appropriateness. Inappropriate drug
donation is a common phenomenon in disaster relief. Van Dijk et al. [190] estimate
that over 70% of the drugs donated in the 2004 Asian Tsunami response in Aceh
(Indonesia) and Sri Lanka proved inappropriate and were ultimately incinerated.
4.5 Conclusion
Despite efforts to educate donors about the problems they cause, in-kind donations
are significant and growing. So long as the motivations described in Chapter 2 and
the channels described in Chapter 3 remain as they are, we can expect this trend to
continue and the challenges described in this chapter to grow. Chapter 5 summarizes
the full scope of the problem in a comprehensive framework that helps to identify
possible solutions and intervention opportunities to reduce the unproductive in-kind
giving in disaster response and the impact of the second disaster.
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CHAPTER V
COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK AND A
STRUCTURED SOLUTION APPROACH
5.1 Introduction
Unsolicited material donations pose a key challenge for humanitarian relief organiza-
tions in disaster response both in the U.S. and internationally. Over the years, many
relief NGOs have invested significant staff time and logistics resources to process these
donations only to find that most could not be used for relief purposes and instead
accumulated at the disaster site creating what has come to be known as “the second
disaster”. To avoid the second disaster, many prominent NGOs no longer accept
unsolicited in-kind donations and have mounted public campaigns promoting “cash
only” donations.
To further improve donation management, the U.S. FEMA, the Aidmatrix Foun-
dation1 and several corporate sponsors have partnered to create the “National Do-
nation Management Network”, a web portal that allows NGOs and donors to post
their needs and donation offers. Unfortunately, neither the “cash only” campaigns
nor the donation portal has stopped the flow of unsolicited donations to disaster sites,
as is evident from news articles covering disaster relief efforts from 2012 Superstorm
Sandy in the New York, New Jersey area (See, for example, NPR reports [96] and
[95]). Building public awareness and creating a central donation portal are impor-
tant tools, but they are clearly not enough. Managing the second disaster requires
a comprehensive approach, which takes into account the different donor types and
their motivations and the distribution channels for in-kind donations both in disaster
1A non-profit technology solution provider for improving NGO operations (www.aidmatrix.org)
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and, importantly, in non-disaster contexts.
In this chapter we provide a simple framework to identify and comprehend the
main issues and mechanisms contributing to the second disaster. The framework helps
to structure a comprehensive, tiered approach that does not simply stop at trying to
educate donors, but also recognizes their motivations and the unintended “training”
they receive from the established distribution channels for in-kind donations outside
the context of disasters. In Section 5.2 and 5.3, we discuss the solution approaches
described in literature and the current NGO initiatives to reduce the impacts of the
second disaster. We describe our framework in Section 5.4 and propose a tiered
strategy in Section 5.5 and illustrate it with potential implementations.
5.2 Solution approaches proposed in the literature
The disaster relief literature and NGO reports address the question of unsolicited do-
nations from an operational point of view and, as a consequence, propose operational
strategies for dealing with them. Because of the difficulties discussed in Chapter 4 in-
volved in managing in-kind donations in disaster relief, Balcik et al. [45] suggest that
NGOs refuse in-kind donations in disaster response. Many established NGOs, includ-
ing the IFRC (which does, nevertheless, accept very targeted corporate donations),
MSF and CARE, follow this advice.
Media publicity of victims’ need can bring more unwanted items in disaster relief.
Empirical evidence (see [182]) suggests that media coverage can affect the size of the
response (cash and in-kind) in disaster relief and Besiou et al. [141] point out that
media coverage tends to increase the flow of unwanted items in disaster relief. Since
greater coverage can drive more donations, it is important to inform the general public
about appropriate giving. Holgúın-Veras et al. ([120] and [121]) suggest increasing
public awareness through media campaigns promoting appropriate giving.
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Van Wassenhove [192] and others [75, 73] suggest categorization of donated ma-
terials to prioritize efforts in disaster relief. Establishing guidelines and acceptance
criteria can help NGO staffs to make faster and more consistent decisions in times of
crisis and prevent inappropriate donations from entering relief supply channels in the
first place. Holgúın-Veras et al. [117] recommend Pan American Health Organiza-
tion’s (PAHO’s) donation classification system (As part of the Humanitarian SUpply
MAnagement System or SUMA, which is a software system developed by PAHO in
1992 in cooperation wtih WHO. It allows users to classify and track donations), which
classifies each donation as: 1. Urgent or High Priority items (HP), 2. Non-urgent or
Low Priority items (LP) or 3. Non-priority (NP) items. Although Holgúın-Veras et
al. [117] recommend classifying donations based solely on the need, they recognize
the influence of donor pressure on NGOs. It is important to acknowledge the role of
donor pressure in NGO decisions and to integrate donor influence into the decision
framework. In Chapter 6, we present a decision framework that considers both the
appropriateness of the product and relationship with the donor.
Thomas et al. [183] and Van Wassenhove et al. [139] suggest NGOs build prior
partnerships with companies to receive appropriate donations in a timely manner
for greater impact. Thomas et al. [183] describe various forms of corporate donor
and NGO partnerships for more effective response: single company and NGO, multi-
company consortium etc. The levels of engagement can vary in these partnerships
ranging from simple philanthropic contributions (cash and in-kind) in disaster relief
to long term capacity development for NGOs for effective relief operations. Balcik
et al. [45] suggest a greater level of coordination among NGOs and donors to match
donations and needs. Most international NGOs have fund raising offices in North
America, Europe, Australia and some countries in Asia (e.g. Japan) where donation
decisions are made, but the fund raising staffs must coordinate with local country or
regional offices to match donation offers with needs. Kovacs et al. [106] observe that
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this coordination could be better in practice.
To promote greater coordination and increased visibility of donations across relief
organizations, Tomasini et al. [186] suggest information sharing among NGOs and
advocate for technology solutions such AidMatrix’s donation management portal.
Other suggestions include re-allocation of unwanted items and bringing them back
from the disaster site [154] and pre-staging in-kind donations outside the disaster site
for better screening and consolidation [45].
This list summarizes and provides references for proposals in the literature for
reducing unsolicited donations:
• Not accepting any in-kind donations [45]
• Establishing partnerships with business donors [183, 192, 61]
• Pre-staging in-kind donations before sending to disaster site [45]
• Developing donation acceptance criteria or guidelines [73, 192]
• Information systems providing donation visibility [73, 120, 132, 135]
• Reallocating unwanted donations to other events [154]
• Media publicity informing donors how to give responsibly [120, 121, 141]
5.3 NGO efforts
Disaster relief NGOs and government agencies responding to disasters are aware of the
crippling effect of the second disaster in any large scale disaster response. To mitigate
the second disaster, USAID formed the Center for International Disaster Information
(CIDI) in 1988, one month after Hurricane Gilbert made landfall as a Category 5
storm that affected 10 countries, including the United Sates, Mexico, Jamica, Haiti
and others. CIDI’s main objective has been to educate the public on the detrimental
effects of inappropriate material donations in disaster relief and to encourage cash
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donations. Similarly, the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and
National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (NVOAD), a NGO membership
organization for disaster relief NGOs, recognized the problem and created their own
donor guidelines and public service announcements and formed working committees
to investigate the issue (e.g., the donation management committee at NVOAD).
The initiatives taken by NGOs and advocacy groups (CIDI, NVOAD) have mostly
focused on donor education and information sharing. CIDI airs public service an-
nouncements, answers donor inquiries and engages with various community groups
to provide education on the destructive effects of unsolicited material donations. A
coalition of organizations, including USAID, CIDI, the UPS Foundation, NVOAD and
led by the Ad Council, promotes cash giving though various media [163]. In 2007,
FEMA, the Aidmatrix Foundation and several corporate sponsors created National
Donations Management NetworkTM(the donation portal managed by Aidmatrix) to
help donors and NGOs post their donation offers and needs for better communication
and donation management. Unfortunately, these solution approaches have not sig-
nificantly diminished the flow of unsolicited donations in disaster relief as is evident
from news reports following the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, the 2011 Japan Tsunami and
the 2012 Superstorm Sandy in the U.S..
With increased use of social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, individuals
and community groups have more ways to reach out to victims and learn about the
situation on the ground [107, 158, 33], which, as we discussed in Chapter 2, increases
donors’ “awareness of the need” and motivates them to contribute in a more direct
way. The traditional model of disaster response is increasingly challenged by donors
who can see that needs are not being met. If established relief organizations are unable
to provide timely support to victims, local groups may, with even greater scale and
sophistication. Many local volunteer groups are now more active in domestic disaster
response as social media allow them to organize and receive donations quickly and
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help victims directly. A Time magazine article [175] calls this model “peer to peer”
aid, which is becoming increasingly popular in domestic disaster response in the U.S..
These local volunteer groups often do not have a formal structure or prior ex-
perience in disaster response and are more willing to accept all kinds of donations
including unsolicited and often inappropriate in-kind donations, opening up a new
channel for those wishing to donate in-kind despite established NGOs’ efforts to pro-
mote “cash only” giving. We argue that unless relief organizations become more
efficient and responsive in meeting victims’ needs in a timely manner, efforts to en-
courage cash donations will become less and less effective. Donors motivated by an
increased awareness that the victims’ needs are not being met will find other ways
(e.g., through these grass-root organizations) to deliver the goods they have to offer.
Ignoring in-kind donations will not make the problem go away.
The other notable solution in this regard is AidMatrix’s National Donations Man-
agement NetworkTM, which allows NGOs to post requests and donors to post offers.
In an ideal world, donors would respond to specific NGO requests and NGOs could
use the portal to accept donor offers. Although the portal represents an important
step forward, this ideal situation is the exception rather than the rule. Donors post
what they have without regard for specific NGO requests and the task of sifting
through the thousands of donor offers posted after a major disaster, let alone of vet-
ting donors and specific donation offers, is still frustrating and time-consuming for
hard-pressed NGO staff. Donors, on the other hand, become frustrated when their
offers are not accepted quickly and frequently decide to simply send the donations
directly regardless of whether they have been accepted and often without any specific
consignee.
NGO efforts to reduce unsolicited in-kind donations to disaster relief have not
solved the problem. Unsolicited and inappropriate donations is still a serious challenge
even for domestic disaster response (see for example, 2013 NPR report [95])
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5.4 A systematic approach to the second disaster
Current efforts are clearly not sufficient to prevent the second disaster and simply
doing more of the same is not the answer. Many of the current interventions are as
effective as we could reasonably expect them to be given the powerful motivations
for giving in-kind and the available channels for doing so. Instead we believe that
to significantly reduce the second disaster will require a comprehensive framework
capturing the full scope of the issue and identifying all the opportunities to intervene
in the generation and flow of unsolicited donations. Rather than wistfully hoping
one silver bullet will prove 100% effective in deterring inappropriate donations, we
must pragmatically construct a systematic, mult-layered array of interventions each
of which deters only a fraction of the inappropriate flows, but which together dra-
matically diminish the problem.
A framework helps us more easily visualize and comprehend the full scope and
complexity of the problem within a single simple, intuitive structure. We propose
a comprehensive and structured framework that can serve as a basis for developing
and evaluating different solution strategies. The framework helps position existing
strategies, such as donor education, donation portals and “just say no” strategies as
well as identify gaps in our strategies. A comprehensive solution framework must
address:
• Who: Who donates in-kind in disaster relief and who receives those donations?
• Why: Why these organizations engage in the current in-kind donation practices?
• How: How in-kind donations flow from original donors to final beneficiaries?
• What: What relationships exist among different entities and how these rela-
tionships influence behavior?
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• Where: Where are the opportunities to intervene in the process to mitigate the
second disaster?
A complex problem such as the second disaster with multiple entities operating un-
der a variety of motivations and through diverse relationships can rarely be addressed
effectively by any single initiative. Instead, complex problems require a coordinated
array of initiatives each contributing to an overall mitigating effect. In Chapter 6,
we outline two specific initiatives that could be part of an effective comprehensive
strategy.
In this section we construct a structured and comprehensive framework by identi-
fying the important entities involved in the flow of in-kind donations and incorporating
their motivations, relationships and the transactions among them both in disaster and
non-disaster contexts. Our framework explicitly addresses in-kind giving practices in
non-disaster contexts since donor and NGO motivations and relationships are to a
great extent shaped in and influenced by these contexts.
Based on our definitions in Chapter 3, we distinguish four kinds of entities: In-
dividuals and community group donors, Corporate donors, End-use NGOs and In-
termediary NGOs. We exclude Final beneficiaries from the framework as they vary
widely from one disaster to the next and we assume their interests are represented
by the NGOs that serve them. By the time donations reach final beneficiaries, it
is too late to intervene effectively. In this framework we are only concerned about
private donors and NGOs and exclude government agencies. U.S. government in-kind
donations to domestic and international disaster relief are more structured and, while
there is always room for improvement, are not a primary cause of or contributor to the
second disaster. Many foreign governments do send in-kind relief items in response
to large scale international disasters and these efforts are not always well coordinated
or managed. Our framework does not address those “ad-hoc” foreign government
in-kind donations.
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Donor and NGO motivations for giving and accepting in-kind donations is an
important part of the comprehensive understanding. We discuss donor and NGO
motivations in detail in Chapter 2.
The Relationships among these entities are also important for managing in-kind
donations both in non-disaster and disaster contexts. We argue that relationships
formed outside the disaster relief context influence donor and NGO actions in disaster
relief. For example, individuals and community groups regularly donate in-kind to
NGOs in the Resale channel. However, that relationship does not help in disaster
relief as NGOs in the Resale channel do not accept used item donations to support
specific disaster relief efforts. We discuss in Chapter 4 how the lack of established
relationships and channels for individuals and community groups to give in-kind in
disaster relief leads to Channel diversion.
We similarly argue that corporate donors’ relationships established with NGOs to
help manage surplus inventories in non-disaster contexts influence corporate in-kind
donations in disaster relief. Motivated to contribute to disaster relief, corporations
turn to the intermediaries that have helped them manage surplus inventories in the
past and these NGOs find it difficult to refuse in-kind donation offers for disaster
relief from corporate donors with whom they have established relationships. As a
consequence, NGOs sometimes push inappropriate corporate in-kind donations to
disaster relief efforts.
Transactions refers to the specific activities involved in transferring in-kind do-
nations from one entity to another. Unless a proposed transaction or activity is
aligned with participants’ motivations and supported by suitable relationships, it will
fail to produce the desired outcome. The relationships among the entities in non-
disaster contexts help shape transactions in disaster relief. For example, donating
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Figure 9: A comprehensive framework for addressing the second disaster (with cur-
rent solution approaches mapped to it)
used personal items to Resale NGOs in non-disaster contexts creates the perception
and expectation that in-kind donations are valuable to humanitarian relief efforts.
The challenge begins when individual and small group donors want to participate in
similar giving transactions in disaster relief contexts.
Our proposed framework helps us better understand these issues and the conse-
quences of solution strategies taken by NGOs to mitigate the second disaster. For
example, in response to individual and small group donation of unsolicited items, es-
tablished relief NGOs have adopted “Just say no” policies. We argue that “Just say
no” is a purely transactional strategy, which does not address either donor motiva-
tions or the relationships established in non-disaster contexts. NGOs’ and advocacy
groups’ work to convince donors to give responsibly by donating cash does not address
donors’ motivations for choosing in-kind (over cash) discussed in Chapter 2. We map
these interventions (i.e., donor education and “Just say no” policies) in our proposed
framework in Figure 9.
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To better manage unsolicited donations in disaster relief, FEMA has advocated us-
ing Aidmatrix’s National Donation Management Portal to facilitate donation match-
ing. The portal addresses transactions between primarily corporate donors and NGOs
(both intermediary and End-use NGOs) as shown in Figure 9.
These efforts, while valuable, are simply not enough. The framework clearly
highlights our failure to address motivations and existing relationships.
5.5 A tiered strategy
We propose a tiered solution strategy in this section to address the challenge of the
second disaster. The framework helps us identify and understand gaps in our current
strategies and, as discussed in Section 5.4, current interventions: “just say no”, “cash
is best” and the in-kind donation portal, leave many large gaps.
FEMA and NVOAD’s strategies of providing in-kind donation guidelines and tools
(e.g., the donation portal) while also promoting cash donations is an example of a
two-tiered strategy. These organizations clearly recognize that “cash only” campaigns
will not be 100% effective – some donors will continue to donate in-kind, and the in-
kind donation guidelines and tools represent a second tier, intended to help those
who cannot be dissuaded from giving in-kind in disaster relief to at least give more
productively. We too recognize that there will be no silver bullet that can completely
prevent the second disaster and propose systematically constructing a comprehensive
tiered strategy built on the three levels of the framework. The principal tiers of our
strategy are:
Prevent Preventive strategies primarily target motivations in an effort to deter
donors and NGOs from giving and receving inappropriate in-kind donations.
For example, we argue that“Just say no” is not a preventive strategy as it
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Figure 10: A tiered strategy to address the second disaster
does not target motivations. Donor education, however, is a preventive strat-
egy. Other prevent strategies may include revising corporate tax benefits for
product donations and changing financial metrics and reporting practices for
NGOs.
Manage Managing strategies target relationships and transactions with the under-
standing that preventive strategies will not convince all donors to give cash
or only solicited items. Management strategies can be operational or strategic
in nature. For example, “Just say no” policies and the donation portal are
operational strategies for better managing in-kind donations.
In Chapter 6 we describe two specific strategies that could be effective com-
ponents of a broader management strategy: a framework to help NGOs decide
which corporate in-kind donation offers to accept and a“retail donation model”
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that provides a channel for individuals and small groups to make productive
in-kind donations to disaster relief. The retail donation channel is primarily a
management strategy targeting the establishment and use of new relationships
that enable new and more productive transactions. The decision framework is
a management strategy primarily targets at better managing transactions, but
can also be valuble in better managing relationships.
Recover Despite our best efforts to prevent it, the second disaster is likely to remain
a feature of disaster response efforts for years to come. It is important to
anticipate the second disaster and establish mechanisms for resolving it such
as creating and facilitating a Resale channel for the items left in the second
disaster. After the 2012 Sandy response, for example, many donated cloths
were sent to local Salvation Army collection sites in the New York and New
Jersey area. It is important to plan recovery strategies before a disaster strikes
rather than trying to cobble them together after the fact.
5.6 Conclusion
Research [141] suggests that resolving the puzzle of the second disaster will require
systems thinking rather than simply adopting commercial supply chain practices.
The forces affecting humanitarian operations are different and are driven by more
complex motives than simply profit maximization. Our proposed framework provides
a simple, practical and comprehensive description of the problem. To our knowledge,
no other framework proposed in the literature similarly addresses the full scope of
the issues and actors contributing to the second disaster. The framework can also
serve as a basis for policy makers to plan a structured solution approach rather than
implementing various ideas in the hope of finding the right solution.
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CHAPTER VI
PROPOSALS FOR PROMOTING MORE PRODUCTIVE
IN-KIND GIVING PRACTICES AND MANAGEMENT
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we describe two approaches for mitigating the second disaster. These
approaches are intended as part of a larger tiered strategy as proposed in Chapter 5.
These interventions are intended to prevent and manage in-kind donations in disaster
relief and, thereby, reduce the impact of the second disaster. We propose a framework
to help NGOs make better and more timely decisions about which in-kind donation
offers to accept. Our decision framework not only streamlines the task of reaching
a consensus within the organization, reducing the burdens on NGO managers in the
midst of a disaster relief effort, but also helps them screen out more inappropriate
donations. We also propose an alternative in-kind donation channel for individual
donors, which, by giving individual donors a productive way to contribute in-kind,
not only reduces the second disaster, but simultaneously increases the flow of valuable
and appropriate supplies to the disaster response effort.
In Section 6.2, we describe the challenges NGOs face in assessing in-kind donation
offers. We propose a decision framework in Section 6.3 to help NGOs better assess
donation offers. Our framework also provides more meaningful metrics for assessing
the effectiveness of an NGO’s in-kind program over time. We propose a Retail Do-
nation channel in Section 6.5 and describe a remarkably successful, on-line version of
it that was implemented during the 2012 super storm Sandy response.
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6.2 NGO challenges in in-kind donation assessment
Deciding whether or not to accept a donation offer requires balancing the competing
and often incomplete assessments of how well it matches project needs, the importance
or potential of the relationship with the donor, the market value of the donation and
the estimated costs of distributing the donation. In most cases, fund raising staff
either accept the offer based on the importance of the donor or pass it along to project
or program managers for consideration. Sometimes, NGOs accept the donation first
and then attempt to match it a project’s needs. The details of the process vary from
NGO to NGO, but in most cases decisions are made on a case by case basis with little
structure or policy in place to guide the decisions. Our research and interviews with
NGOs suggest even the most established NGOs struggle to balance these conflicting
objectives and lack effective tools for measuring how well the process is working.
The program managers who support the NGO’s projects want to ensure that the
organization only accepts in-kind donations that are appropriate and can be delivered
effectively, while the fund raising team is concerned about how the decision will affect
future relationships with the donor. Fund raisers are often willing to accept low-
priority or even inappropriate items in the hopes of growing a relationship that will
eventually yield more appropriate in-kind donations or even cash donations. And,
since fund raising targets and NGO financial metrics are almost exclusively based
on the market value of donations, it should come as no surprise that the market
value of a donation can influence the decision of whether to accept it or not. A $10
million product donation is much easier for a fund raiser to secure than $ 10 million in
cash grants, but has the same financial impact on the organization and often counts
in the same way towards fulfilling the fund raiser’s annual goals. These competing
objectives between program managers and fund raising managers lead to tensions in
the organization that can make donation acceptance decisions heated, time consuming
and complicated. The process is even more complex after a large scale disaster when
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many donors contact several NGOs simultaneously and award the donation to the
first credible respondent to accept it.
Currently, the two most widely used tools for measuring the effectiveness of in-
kind donation programs are the total market value of donations and some measure
of the number of people benefiting from the donations. Neither considers the appro-
priateness or social impact of the donations and so both naturally influence NGOs to
emphasize other considerations, like market value and donor relationships in deter-
mining which offers to accept.
We propose a decision framework to help NGOs better manage the trade-offs and
formalize the decision process for in-kind donation offers.
6.3 Framework for evaluating in-kind donations
We propose a framework that classifies each in-kind donation offer based on both
the appropriateness of the product or service and the importance or potential of the
relationship with the donor. In our 2012 NGO survey, End-use NGOs 1 identified
donor relationship as the second most important factor in deciding which donation
offers to accept (see Figure 11).
Holgúın-Veras et al. [117] suggest the donation classification system developed by
PAHO, which classifies donations into in three categories: 1. Urgent or High Priority
(HP) 2. Non-urgent or Low-priority (LP) and 3. Non-priority (NP) items, based solely
on their usefulness.
We propose a similar system, which classifies donation offers as Necessary, Use-
ful, Non-qualified or Undefined based on their appropriateness. Necessary products
or services are those that the NGO generally purchases for its projects. Similarly
1We categorize NGOs that distribute 70% or more directly to final beneficiaries are End-use
NGOs
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Figure 11: Ranking of factors affecting End-use NGO’s donation acceptance decision
Non-qualified donations are those that NGOs would never accept because of policy
conflicts or other factors. For example, NGOs that support or promote breast feeding
would not accept donations of baby formula. Useful items are those that are neither
Necessary nor Non-qualified, but can support the NGO’s projects. Any donation that
does not fall into one of these categories is characterized as Undefined.
Since NGOs also consider the importance of the relationship with the donor, we
extend the classification scheme to address this dimension of the decision process.
We differentiate donors into four categories: Highly valued, Valued, Undefined and
Non-qualified donors. Generally, Non-qualified donors are those that do not satisfy
the NGO’s donor criteria. For example, many NGOs do not accept donations from
tobacco companies or from companies that are involved in the manufacture or dis-
tribution of weapons. Each NGO will have its own criteria for distinguishing Highly
Valued and Valued donors, based on the historical donations or estimates of future do-
nation potential. Donors that do not fall into any of these categories are characterized
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as Undefined.
Figure 12: In-kind donation decision matrix
The process of establishing these categories for both products and donors should be
transparent and understandable to both fund raising managers and program managers
and should be accompanied by the development of clearer guidelines and policies
defining the different categories. It is not an exercise that should be completed during
the heat of a disaster response.
We represent the two different decision dimensions, appropriateness and donor
relationship, as the dimensions of a matrix as shown in Figure 12. Donations that fall
in the upper right corner of the matrix are the most desirable. These are donations of
necessary products or services from highly valued donors. Donations that fall in the
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lower left corner are the least desirable. These are donations of undefined products
from non-qualified donors. We simplify the decision process by using the matrix to
categorize each donation offer into one of three categories: Valuable, Supplementary
or Opportunistic donations.
6.3.0.1 Valuable donations
Valuable donations are ideal in-kind donations that simultaneously help advance the
NGO’s mission and build relationships with valued donors. A relief NGO engaged
in ensuring access to clean drinking water, for example, might consider donations of
water purification packets from a Global 500 company such as Proctor and Gamble
as Valuable donations or a food bank might consider regular donations of a variety
of foods from a major retailer such as Walmart as Valuable donations.
6.3.0.2 Supplementary donations
Supplementary donations are either undefined products coming from a highly valued
donor or useful items coming from valued donors. These items should be accepted
based on their operational feasibility, i.e., the programmatic impact of the donation
relative to the cost involved in processing it. Each organization should establish its
own thresholds for such measures. ACCORD’s 2010 “Gifts in kind Standard” [?]
suggests a minimum threshold of 4 (meaning the programmatic impact should be
valued at at least four times the cost of distributing the gift) based on their members’
experiences. While the ACCORD standards do stress the programatic impact, in
practice this tends to be translated into the market value of the donation, which, for
reasons we have discussed, can lead to poor choices. Feeding America, on the other
hand simply uses the weight of the donation, influenced to some extent by simple
measures of its nutritional value and contribution to a balanced diet, in assessing the
impact of in-kind donations.
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6.3.0.3 Opportunistic donations
Opportunistic donation offers are generally neither important to the program man-
agers nor to the fund raisers for relationship building. Many inappropriate corporate
donation offers to disaster relief are opportunistic donations. There are two possible
explanations for why such offers are accepted in disaster relief: 1. The market value
of the donated products and its impact on the NGO’s financial metrics or 2. Poor
decisioning making. Our decision framework helps identify opportunistic donations
and can reduce the second disaster by helping NGOs avoid them in disaster relief. In
rare cases, it may make sense to work with the donor to shift such donations to long
term recovery efforts for the disaster victims, but that should be managed carefully
so that the donation does not impede disaster relief efforts.
Figure 13: In-kind donation received by a NGO for the 2010, Haiti response
6.4 Measuring in-kind donation impact
The matrix categorizes donations based on the dual objectives of appropriateness
or program impact and donor relations. NGOs can use this classification scheme to
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measure and manager the effectiveness of their in-kind donations in meeting overall
objectives. For example, in 2010 we used the matrix to categorize donations to an
established U.S. based international NGO that received approximately $ 2.5 million
worth of corporate in-kind donations including vehicles, blankets, mattresses, etc. as
part of the Haiti earthquake response. Only 16% of the donations (by market value)
were characterized as Valuable. The vast majority (82%) were Supplementary (see
Figure 13).
Although program managers largely expected the results, fund raising managers
were surprised and a bit disappointed to see how much of the donations were Supple-
mentary. But program managers also learned in the process. Some of the Undefined
products categorized as Supplementary donations proved particularly useful and those
products were subsequently added to the list of Necessary products. Using the matrix
is a process of continuous refinement and improvement. We recommended that the
organization set a target for the percentage of donations falling in the Valuable cate-
gory. Armed with a clearer understanding of the metrics and the goals, the corporate
fund raising managers can more effectively work with donors to achieve that target.
Without such metrics, fund raisers will continue to accept high market value
donations from Valued donors without much concern for appropriateness. Upset by
the challenges and embarrassments such in-kind donations create in the field, program
managers will complain until the situation becomes so dire the organization finally
establishes a policy of not accepting any in-kind donations...at least for several years
until an important donor offers products with a high market value and the cycle
begins again.
6.5 A Retail Donation Model
People want to help disaster victims and, for many reasons, including the motivations
we discussed in Chapter 2 and their experiences donating in non-disaster contexts,
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people prefer to donate in-kind to disaster relief. Unfortunately, as we explained in
Chapter 3, there is no formal channel for in-kind donations from individuals and com-
munity groups to disaster relief. The absence of that channel is a primary contributor
to the second disaster.
The goods individuals typically donate, used clothing and household items, are
inappropriate for disaster relief and better suited to the resale channel. But as we
explained in Chapter 3 there is no established resale channel for disaster relief and,
even if there were, it would not provide the kind of immediate impact these donors
seek. They want to know their donations are tangibly and immediately helping the
disaster victims.
An effective tiered strategy to prevent the second disaster then cannot simply
educate individuals and small groups about appropriate giving practices and the
benefits of donating cash, it must also provide these donors with effective channels
for in-kind giving in disaster relief. In this section, we propose just such a channel,
“The Retail donation model”, that allows individuals to donate in-kind to disaster
relief (and in non-disaster contexts) productively, conveniently and in a timely and
effective manner.
The model is simple: NGOs establish a “donation registry” with retailers identi-
fying specific items required for the relief response and the quantities in which they
are needed. Individual donors purchase and donate those items through the retailers
who deliver them directly to the disaster relief effort. The model can be applied
both through brick and mortar stores, as we descibe in Section 6.9, and through
e-commerce sites, as we describe in Section 6.6.
During the 2012 super-storm Sandy response, a grass roots volunteer relief or-
ganization, Occupy Sandy, created just such a registry through the on-line retailer
Amazon and collected over 30,000 items valued at nearly $750,000 in a matter of a
few weeks. The success of this effort proves the concept and serves as a pilot for
111
future implementations.
6.6 Donation Registry: A case study
In the first few weeks after super-storm Sandy, a trio from Brooklyn generated three
quarters of a million dollars worth of useful in-kind donations by repurposing Ama-
zon’s wedding registry as a donation registry (see Figure 14). The group partnered
with Occupy Sandy, which provided a grass-roots distribution network. They chose
Amazon because most of the items needed in the early stages of the response, including
basic relief supplies such as blankets, flash lights, batteries, socks, baby formula, hand
warmers, thermal pants and cleaning and construction tools (large trash bags, wheel
barrows, hammers, and even generators) were available on Amazon’s e-commerce site.
The group publicized the link to the registry through social media networks (Face-
book and Twitter), blogs, radio-shows, and various print and digital media outlets.
A novel idea, the registry link was picked up by the national media, including The
New York Times [99], The Atlantic [108], Bloomberg News [92], the Huffington Post
[128] and others [100]. Within 72 hours, people donated over 10,000 items valued
at over $200,000 through the registry. This rapid and targeted response enabled the
volunteer group to start relief operations quickly.
Donations poured in starting the second day and, thanks to second day delivery,
three UPS trucks filled with valuable donations arrived at the Church of St. Luke
and St. Matthew (nicknamed 520 by volunteers) in Clinton Hill, Brooklyn. The
church served as Occupy Sandy’s main distribution center for receiving and processing
donated items for distribution to field offices in the Rockaways, Staten Island and
Coney Island.
Using personal vehicles and rented vans, volunteers shuttled supplies between 520
and the field offices in response to specific requests and a coordinator updated the
registry to reflect requests from the field and supplies at 520. In the first few days,
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the field offices focused mainly on providing immediate comfort to victims with socks,
thermal clothing, flash lights, blankets, sleeping bags, heaters, etc. As the days passed
and other NGOs started supplying these items, the field offices shifted their focus to
clean-up and rebuilding operations. The registry coordinator added tools and home
repair supplies such as safety glasses, work gloves, respirators, hammers and electric
saws.
Despite concerns that duplicate registries might confuse donors, the group subse-
quently opened separate registries for each of the three field offices to avoid shuttling
donations from 520. The group also created a donation registry with products from
local businesses with the goal of helping both the victims and the local economy at
the same time. This involved building a separate e-commerce platform without the
name recognition of Amazon. While this local registry did receive some donations, it
was not nearly as successful as the Amazon registry and required much more work.
As the case study illustrates, a donation registry with online retailers provides an
effective tool to help relief organizations solicit targeted in-kind donations in disaster
response. The registry also helps individual donors, who prefer to donate in-kind,
contribute more productively to relief efforts. The registry allowed Occupy Sandy
volunteers to control the flow of donations by adding and removing items, or changing
the requested quantities based on the actual needs at that time. Amazon’s established
delivery process ensured the timely delivery of donated items.
Although Amazon does offer a non-profit wish list, the team chose to use the wed-
ding registry instead for better control and marketing. For example, it was important
for the group to connect with donors to provide feedback on their donations and the
wedding registry provides this via the Thank You List. The non-profit wish list does
not provide this functionality. People are also more familiar with wedding registries.
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Figure 14: Schematic diagram of the retail donation model with an e-commerce
retailer.
6.7 Implementation challenges
Although the donation registry model can be applied to any domestic disaster re-
sponse, the team did face several challenges and learned several lessons during the
Sandy relief effort:
6.7.0.4 Order consolidation
Amazon separately packed and shipped individual donations, creating additional work
at Amazon’s DC and for the volunteers, who had to open, sort and stock items one
by one and dispose of thousands of boxes, packing materials, etc.
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6.7.0.5 Refresh rate of the registry
The team faced challenges with the registry, as it did not reflect purchases in real
time. In some cases, the time lag between a purchase and the corresponding update
was considerable.
6.7.0.6 Shipping visibility
Although donors could track their packages, Occupy Sandy had little or no visibility
of the incoming donations unless donors emailed their tracking numbers. Even then,
individually tracking tens of thousands of donations was difficult and time consuming
for volunteers.
6.7.0.7 Last mile traceability
Occupy Sandy did not have its own tracking and documentation tools. Visibility
and accounting essentially ended once the donated items left 520. Volunteers did
photograph the distribution operations and shared those photos with donors via blogs,
social media and emails, but the organization did not keep records tracing a donation
from a specific donor to a specific beneficiary.
6.7.0.8 Tax reporting
Occupy Sandy was not a registered 501(c)3 corporation and so donations to the effort
were not tax deductible. Even if Occupy Sandy had been a registered non-profit, the
Amazon registry did not provide sufficient information to connect specific donors to
specific donations and to provide those donors with gift acknowledgment letters.
6.7.0.9 Profits
Amazon sold the items purchased on the registry at full retail price and did not offer
special terms for transportation. This raises the quite reasonable concern among
donors that the company earned a profit from their charitable contributions.
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6.7.0.10 Returns
The changing estimates of needs and delays in refreshing the registry meant many
items arrived in greater quantities than were required – a common issue in disaster
relief. It was not clear how Amazon’s return process would work in this case: Would
funds for returned items go back to the donor or would they go to Occupy Sandy
in the form of a “store credit” that the organization could apply to future purchases
from Amazon?
6.8 Donation portal vs. donation registry
In contrast to a registry like the one Occupy Sandy implemented, a central donation
portal such as Aidmatrix’s National Donations Management Network portal is im-
portant for managing unsolicited donation offers, especially bulk inventory donations
from businesses. A portal gives donors the freedom to offer what they have rather
than forcing them to choose from among a prescribed list of items. This freedom can
be valuable to donors and NGOs alike. For example, after the 2010 Haiti earthquake,
CARE USA accepted a company’s offer of generators through the Aidmatrix dona-
tion portal. Although CARE had not posted a request for generators, they proved to
be one of the most valuable in-kind donations the organization received during the
Haiti relief effort.
Not all corporate donations are valuable or appropriate for disaster relief and
many small groups who organize donation collection events also post offers – usually
of unsorted mixed supplies of various items. NGOs find the effort of sorting through
the thousands of well-intentioned, but inappropriate postings frustrating and time-
consuming. Even when they do find a potentially valuable donation, it is rarely
described to the level of detail required to determine whether accepting it is worth
the cost and risk involved. Does the donation include the transportation costs, or
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Table 5: Difference between FEMA’s donation portal and the retail donation registry
Donation Portal Donation registry
Donors choose donation items Relief agencies choose donation items
No reliability of donated prod-
ucts/donation offers
Reliability ensured by the retailers
Donation offers are based on what
donors want to donate
Donated items are based on the actual
need on the ground
NGOs must decide whether or not to
accept the donation
Donors decide whether or not to make
the donation
No established delivery mechanism Commercial delivery through the re-
tailer
Response slowed by heavy demands on
NGO staff
Limited demands on NGO staff ensure
a fast, seamless donation process
More suitable for business inventory
donations
More suitable for individual and small
group donations
must the NGO cover those? Is the donor an appropriate partner for the NGO? A
donation registry like the one used by Occupy Sandy eliminates most of these issues
and concerns for the NGO.
A donation portal can be made more effective with additional services and tools
to validate the donation offer and NGO’s needs. Some improvement opportunities
include: pre-registration and verification of donors and NGOs, donor classification
based on previous donation history or even a formal donor certification process en-
suring the donor understands good donation practices, collecting feedback from NGOs
to close the loop on the donor classification process, etc. These enhancements can
significantly increase the value of the donation portal and make in-kind giving faster,
more efficient, transparent, and easier for both NGOs and donors.
6.9 Brick and mortar version of the retail donation model
A donation registry can also be applied to brick and mortar stores, where customers
can purchase and donate marked registry items. Many retailers and NGOs currently
collaborate to organize similar donation collection events for non-disaster contexts
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such as the U.S. Marine Corp’s “Toys for Tots” program [6], which collects toys for
disadvantaged children for the holiday season. The small steps of collecting emergency
relief items instead of toys and ramping up the program after a disaster rather than
before the holiday season could have a profound impact not only by reducing the
second disaster, but also by creating a significant stream of timely and valuable relief
supplies.
A donation registry creates opportunities for retailers to engage employees in phil-
anthropic efforts and strengthen relationships with local communities. The registry
provides a productive outlet for the community’s good intentions and creates an as-
sociation between the “warm glow” individuals feel when they give and the store
where they made that donation. Store employees and local volunteers can enjoy the
personal engagement of sorting, packing and sending donated items to the disaster
site through the retailer. The involvement of large retailers gives donors greater con-
fidence that their donations will go to the disaster relief effort and be used for the
intended purpose.
6.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present two intervention ideas to reduce the flow of unsolicited
donations in the disaster response that can be effective components of a larger tiered
solution strategy as proposed in Chapter 5. The donation assessment matrix can
help NGOs sift through corporate donations in a structured way and thus can help
Prevent some inappropriate donations from entering disaster relief channels. The
retail donation model can help Prevent individuals from making inappropriate in-
kind donations by providing an alternative, productive channel for them to contribute
needed items and thus can help Manage in-kind donations in disaster relief. We
describe a successful on-line implementation of the model with Amazon in 2012 after
super-storm Sandy and discuss some of the challenges encountered in the process.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
In-kind donations to NGOs are likely to continue and even grow as many donors
prefer to donate in-kind to various social causes. The dominant theory in individual
giving suggests the motive for giving may not be purely altruistic, rather it is a mix
of altruism and donor’s self-interest. Donating in-kind can be preferable to donors as
it is often more economical, comparatively resistant to fraud or misuse and provides
psychological and social benefits. Donating goods and services provides companies
with opportunities for employee engagement, greater publicity and disposal of sur-
plus inventories. Donation to charity is increasingly becoming the preferred choice
of disposal for surplus inventories and used personal items. Many NGOs have em-
braced in-kind donations and have created different operating models and distribution
channels to employ them.
The challenges of unsolicited material donations in disaster relief are related to
donor and NGO motivations for giving and accepting in-kind donations. The Re-
sale channel that allows individual donors to give in-kind does not accept those same
donations for disaster relief. The absence of any formal channel compels many in-
dividual donors to create their own ad-hoc delivery mechanisms, including sending
their donations to the disaster site without a consignee. Companies on the other hand
send donations directly to national and local disaster relief NGOs and through inter-
mediary NGOs. Although Direct distribution NGOs are generally reluctant to accept
individual in-kind donations, they are more open for accepting product donations
from companies primarily because of an existing relationship with the donor or the
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opportunity to build a relationship. Besides, the higher value of corporate donations
often motivates NGOs to accept these donations to achieve financial targets.
Current approaches for addressing the second disaster such as campaigns for “cash
only” donations and FEMA’s National Donation Management Network portal fail to
adequately address donor motivations, economic incentives and the current channel
structure for in-kind donations in disaster relief. Solving the second disaster requires
NGOs and donors to change their current behavior and so long as education cam-
paigns and donation portals do not change motivations, incentives or opportunities,
they will not profoundly influence behavior. We argue that solving this problem will
require more comprehensive thinking, a structured strategy and a comprehensive set
of carefully targeted interventions. We develop just such a comprehensive framework
and propose tiered strategy for reducing the second disaster, including two specific
interventions that could be key components of that strategy. The work of this thesis
lays the foundation for future research and innovative solutions in this very important
but understudied area. We summarize some of the future research and intervention
areas here.
This thesis is primarily focused on improving the management of in-kind donations
in disaster relief for NGOs. We do discuss various ways corporate donors can use
product donation for strategic philanthropic engagement (e.g. WalMart’s “Fighting
Hunger Together” and Pfizer’s Zithromax donations to fight blinding Trachoma), but
do not propose specific strategies for donors in this thesis. We feel this is an important
next step. Helping donors integrate in-kind donations in particular and philanthropy
more generally into their larger corporate strategies can help unlock enormous reserves
with tremendous potential value for humanitarian relief and development efforts.
Our research focus on in-kind giving by private donors can be expanded to cover
other areas such as government in-kind giving in disaster relief. We address some as-
pects of government in-kind giving in our discussion of donor motivations , however,
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we do describe those channels of distribution and how they interact with other relief
organizations. Future research in this area should address government donation mo-
tivations and channels and their overall impact on humanitarian logistics operations.
We propose a new “retail donation” channel to allow individuals to make targeted
in-kind donations in disaster relief. A on-line retail donation model was successfully
implemented during the 2012 Sandy response. Future research in this area needs to
build on and refine that initial implementation and explore the feasibility of applying
such models in “brick and mortar” settings.
The increasing use of social media during disaster relief operations points to op-
portunities to monitor and influence donor activities and preferences for helping the
victims. Social networks have enabled donor groups to bypass traditional NGOs and
help people directly. This new grass roots power can potentially lead to an even larger
second disaster. On the other hand, properly harnessed, social networks may ulti-
mately prove a powerful force for good in humanitarian response. Witness the power
of Facebook and Twitter in promoting Occupy Sandy’s donation registry. We feel
that a critical area of future research is to better understand and shape the impact
of social media on in-kind giving practices and channels of distributions.
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APPENDIX A
2012 NGO PROFESSIONAL’S GIFTS-IN-KIND
MANAGEMENT SURVEY
A.1 Survey administration and participants
The survey was distributed to member NGOs of the Accord Network and of the Part-
nership for Quality Medical Donations (PQMD). Accord Network is a membership
organization of 60 Christian faith based NGOs that work in various relief and devel-
opment areas. The Network has organized several Gifts In Kind (GIK) Conferences
since 2009, to per our knowledge the only conferences of this kind. PQMD has 15
NGO members some of which are also members of the Accord Network. We also
invited a number of intermediary NGOs that are not part of either of these groups
but did participate in previous GIK conferences.
The survey invitation was sent out on July 20, 2012 and the last opportunity to
respond was originally August 04, 2012, but was later extended to August 13,2012
to allow greater participation. Respondents were promised anonymity to encourage
candid responses about the their GIK related management practices ( the invitation
email is attached). To maintain the promised anonymity, we do not include the names
of the organizations in this thesis. However, together these organizations receive over
$ 1.5 billion in annual in-kind donations from business donors. The survey does not
include organizations that primarily receive in-kind donations from individuals and
community groups for resale .
We received confirmation from 24 NGOs over email expressing their interest to
participate. We used the“Qualtrics” survey software to conduct the survey. We re-
ceived a total of 34 complete responses from 29 unique IP addresses. Further analysis
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of the IP addresses suggests 3 organizations had 2 participants respond and 1 organi-
zation had 3 participants respond. We could not resolve additional 5 responses ( the
difference between the number of unique IP addresses and the number of NGOs that
confirmed their participation). They may represent the same organizations with re-
spondents participating from remote locations and hence having different IP addresses
or they may represent different NGOs.
The survey questions with results are attached in Section A.3.
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A.2 Survey invitation email
Dear fellow past GIK summit attendees and friends:
I invite you all to participate in a short GIK management survey as part of Georgia
Tech’s research project in GIK Management for NGOs. The survey result will be used
to validate some of decision models that we have developed for GIK management to
help NGOs strategically manage GIK donations.
The goal of the survey is to capture some of the operational and strategic challenges
of GIK operations in a structured format. The survey result will identify common
challenges, practices and can potentially serve as a basis for a future bench-marking
study.
Benefit and cost to you:
The survey result can serve as a reference to GIK managers about current practices
and and challenges in the industry. The consolidated survey result can help you to
separate common challenges from your organization specific challenges. There is no
monetary benefit or cost associated with the participation.
Survey administration and use of the survey result:
This will be an anonymous survey through an online survey tool (Qulatrics) to encour-
age respondents to reveal their actual practices and challenges in GIK management
without risking their organization’s reputation. All the survey responses will be col-
lected in a fashion so that there is no one to one connection between a response and
the organization.
The primary use of the survey data is to validate some of our hypotheses in GIK re-
search and decision models that we have developed at Georgia Tech to help NGOs and
donors make better decisions. However, the survey result will be shared immediately
with the participants for their internal use.
Time required to participate:




Participation confirmation deadline : Wednesday July 25th, 2012
Survey ends: Midnight Saturday, August 04, 2012
Result available (via email) : Monday Aug 06, 2012
If you are interested to participate, Please reply to this email by Wednesday (July
25, 2012) with your organization’s name. Once you confirm your participation, I will
send you the online survey link to participate in this survey.
I personally met many of you over the last few years through GIK summits and
conferences. I encourage you all to participate in this survey. A large number of
participation will only benefit everyone in the industry. If you have any further




A.3 Survey questions and responses
The survey questions are results are as follows:
1. What Side of GIK operation you are involved in ?
# Answer Responses Percetange(%)
1 GIK fund-raising and sourcing 11 33.33%
2 Preparing GIK offers for projects 7 21.21%
3 Logistics and GIK delivery 7 21.21%
4 All of the above 22 66.67%
2. What is the size of your GIK program ( in $ value/year) ?
# Answer Responses Percetange(%)
1 Below $10 million/ year 7 20.59%
2 Between $10 to $20 million / year 4 11.76%
3 Between $ 20 to $30 million/ year 2 5.88%
4 Between $30 to $40 million/year 0 0.00%
5 Between $40 to $50 million/year 1 2.94%
6 Between $50 to $60 million/year 3 8.82%
7 Between $60 to $70 million/year 2 5.88%
8 Between $70 to $80 million/year 0 0.00%
9 Between $80 to $90 million/year 1 2.94%
10 Between $90 to $100 million/year 0 0.00%
11 Over $100 million/year 14 41.18%
3. What is the approximate % breakdown of your GIK donation types (product
and services, not including general volunteering) ?
# Answer Mean Std. Deviation
1 Product donations 91.79 13.19
2 Professional service donations 7.74 13.24
3 Other types of GIKs 0.47 1.60
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4. Approximately, what percentage of the total revenue comes from GIK for your
organization ?
# Answer Responses Percentage(%)
1 Less than 10% 6 17.65%
2 Between 10% to 20% 2 5.88%
3 Between 20% to 30% 5 14.71%
4 Between 30% to 40% 1 2.79%
5 Between 40% to 50% 1 2.79%
6 Between 50% to 60% 4 11.76%
7 Between 60% to 70% 0 0.00%
8 Between 70% to 80% 1 2.94%
9 Between 80% to 90% 9 26.47%
10 Over 90% 5 14.71%
5. Approximately, what is your total GIK operational cost as a % of the total
GIK revenue ?
# Answer Responses Percentage (%)
1 Less than 1% 9 26.47%
2 1% to less than 3% 11 32.35%
3 3% to less than 5% 6 17.65%
4 5% to less than 7% 4 11.76%
5 7% to less than 9% 1 2.94%
6 Over 9% 3 8.82%
6. Which one of these choices closely match your organization’s program focus ?
# Answer Responses Percentage (%)
1 Over 90% of total budget in devel-
opment projects
11 32.25%
2 80% development, 20% relief 8 23.53%
3 60% development, 40% relief 6 17.65%
4 40% development and 60% relief 5 14.71%
5 80% relief, 20% development 4 11.76%
6 Over 90% in relief operations 3 8.82%
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7. Approximately how many 40 ft ocean container equivalent GIKs you receive
every year ? (use 20 pallets = 1 ocean container (40 ft.), 1 Truckload = 1.3 40 ft.
ocean container for estimation purposes)
# Answer Responses Percentage (%)
1 Less than 10 3 8.82%
2 between 10 to 50 9 26.47%
3 between 50 to 100 7 20.59%
4 between 100 to 150 2 5.88%
5 between 150 to 200 1 2.94%
6 Over 200 12 35.29%
8. Do you directly distribute most ( approx. over 70%) of your GIKs to final
beneficiaries ?
# Answer Responses Percentage (%)
1 Yes 15 44.12 %
2 No (we distribute most of our GIKs
through partners
19 55.88%
9. What is the approximate % breakdown of your GIK source ?
# Answer Mean Std. Deviation
1 Original donor 66.12 38.08
2 Purchased GIK with paid service
fees
14.85 26.51
3 From other NGOs without any ser-
vice fees
15.58 28.22
4 Other sources (not listed here) 4.35 15.70
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10. What is the approximate % breakdown of your GIK donations by destinations
?
# Answer Mean Std. Deviation
1 North America (US domestic) 18.97 30.40
2 Africa 26.79 28.29
3 Latin America 22.30 26.17
4 Asia 10.41 18.64
5 Other 22.18 32.00
11. Approximatey what fraction of your GIK donations would you say are unso-
licited ? (i.e. not based on any specific program request ?)
# Answer Responses Percetage (%)
1 0-25% of total $ value 20 58.82
2 25-50% of total $ value 3 8.82
3 50-75% of total $ value 4 11.76
4 Over 75% of total $ value 7 20.59
12. Please re-organize this list of factors as it relates to your GIK acceptance
decision (the most important factor for decision making should be at the top of the
list)
# Answer Mean Std. deviation
1 Product Appropriateness 1.47 1.05
2 Whether other NGOs will be able
the use it or not
3.24 1.95
3 Logistics cost of the donation 3.82 1.11
4 Existing relationship with the donor 3.88 1.32
5 Size of the donation ( in volume or
numbers)
3.88 1.34
6 $ value of the donation 4.71 1.45
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13. Rank the following GIK challenges as it relates to your operation
# Answer Mean Std. deviation
1 Getting appropriate products for
programs
1.74 1.44
2 Custom clearance for international
donations
3.94 2.12
3 Visibility of the donation and donor
reporting
4.00 1.72
4 Transportation and storage in recip-
ient countries for international do-
nations
4.03 1.66
5 Valuation of the donated items 4.06 1.34
6 Lack of logistics infrastructure to
collect and deliver donated products
5.12 1.34
7 Saying ”No” to important donors
for inappropriate donations
5.12 1.81
14. How would you characterize your current GIK solicitation activities ?
# Answer Responses Percentage (%)
1 Completely reactive (only respond-
ing to donation offers)
1 2.94%
2 Mostly reactive 8 23.53%
3 Almost equal mix of both reactive
and proactive in nature
9 26.47%
4 Mostly proactive 12 35.29%




15. Do you receive cash donations from your GIK donors ?
# Answer Responses Percentage (%)
1 Never 4 11.76%
2 Occasionally 23 67.65%
3 Fairly Many Times 5 14.71%
4 Very Often 2 5.88%
5 Always 0 0.00%
16. How often you report back to your GIK donors about their donation impact
?
# Answer Responses Percentage (%)
1 Never 0 0.00%
2 Rarely 0 0.00%
3 Sometimes 7 20.59%
4 Most of the Time 2 50.00%
5. Always 10 29.41%
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APPENDIX B
NGO DIFFERENCES IN DECISION PRIORITIES AND
CHALLENGES BASED ON ORGANIZATION
CHARACTERISTICS
B.1 Difference of factors influencing NGO GIK acceptance
decisions
NOTE: The mean value shows the average ranking. Lower value means higher
importance
1. Ranking of factors related to GIK acceptance decision by NGO grouped by
their relationship with the original donor ( N =34)
Ranking of factors for organiza-
tions receiving 70% or more of
donations from original donors
(N =23)
Mean value
(scale 1 - 6)
Ranking of factors for orga-
nizations receiving less than
70% of donations from origi-
nal donors (N=11)
Mean value
(scale 1 - 6)
Product Appropriateness 1.35 Product Appropriateness 1.73
Whether other NGOs will be
able the use it or not
3.09 Whether other NGOs will be
able the use it or not
3.55
Existing relationship with the
donor
3.61 Logistics cost of the donation 3.55
Logistics cost of the donation 3.96 Size of the donation ( in vol-
ume or numbers)
3.64
Size of the donation ( in volume
or numbers)
4.00 $ value of the donation 4.09




2. Ranking of factors related to GIK acceptance decision by NGO grouped by
their relationship with final beneficiaries ( N =34)
Ranking of factors for organiza-
tions distributing most of their
donations directly to beneficia-
ries (N =15)
Mean value
(scale 1 - 6)
Ranking of factors for orga-
nizations distributing most of
their donations through part-
ner NGOs ( N=19)
Mean value
(scale 1 - 6)
Product Appropriateness 1.40 Product Appropriateness 1.53
Existing relationship with the
donor
3.27 Whether other NGOs will be
able the use it or not
2.32
Logistics cost of the donation 3.53 Logistics cost of the donation 4.05
Size of the donation ( in volume
or numbers)
3.60 Size of the donation ( in vol-
ume or numbers)
4.11
Whether other NGOs will be
able the use it or not
4.40 Existing relationship with the
dono
4.37
$ value of the donation 4.80 $ value of the donation 4.63
3. Ranking of factors related to GIK acceptance decision by NGO grouped by
their size of the GIK program ( $ value/ year) ( N =34)
Ranking of factors for organiza-
tions receiving more than $ 100
million GIK / year (N =14)
Mean value
(scale 1 - 6)
Ranking of factors for or-
ganizations receiving less
than $100 million GIK /year
(N=20)
Mean value
(scale 1 - 6)
Product Appropriateness 1.50 Product Appropriateness 1.45
Whether other NGOs will be
able the use it or no
2.71 Logistics cost of the donation 3.55
Size of the donation ( in volume
or numbers)
3.57 Whether other NGOs will be
able the use it or not
3.60
Existing relationship with the
donor
4.00 Existing relationship with the
donor
3.80
Logistics cost of the donation 4.21 Size of the donation ( in vol-
ume or numbers)
4.10
$ value of the donation 5.00 $ value of the donation 4.50
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B.2 Difference in GIK operational challenges faced by NGOs
1. Ranking of GIK operational challenges faced by NGO, grouped by their relation-
ship with the original donor ( N =34)
Ranking of GIK challenges for
organizations receiving 70% for
more of donations from original
donors (N =23)
Mean value
(scale 1 - 6)
Ranking of GIK challenges for
organizations receiving less
than 70% of donations from
original donors (N=11)
Mean value
(scale 1 - 6)
Getting appropriate products
for programs
1.35 Getting appropriate products
for programs
2.55
Custom clearance for interna-
tional donation
3.91 Valuation of the donated
items
3.45
Visibility of the donation and
donor reporting
4.04 Visibility of the donation and
donor reporting
3.91
Transportation and storage in
recipient countries for interna-
tional donations
4.09 Transportation and storage in
recipient countries for interna-
tional donations
3.91
Valuation of the donated items 4.35 Custom clearance for interna-
tional donation
4.00
Saying “No” to important
donors for inappropriate dona-
tions
4.96 Lack of logistics infrastructure
to collect and deliver donated
products
4.73
Lack of logistics infrastructure
to collect and deliver donated
products
5.30 Saying “No” to important




2. Ranking of GIK operational challenges faced by NGOs, grouped by their rela-
tionship with final beneficiaries (N =34)
Ranking of GIK challenges for
organizations distributing most
of their donations directly to
beneficiaries (N =15)
Mean value
(scale 1 - 6)
Ranking of GIK challenges
for organizations distribut-




(scale 1 - 6)
Getting appropriate products
for programs
1.47 Getting appropriate products
for programs
1.95
Valuation of the donated items 3.73 Custom clearance for interna-
tional donation
3.53
Visibility of the donation and
donor reporting
3.93 Visibility of the donation and
donor reporting
3.91
Transportation and storage in
recipient countries for interna-
tional donations
3.93 Transportation and storage in
recipient countries for interna-
tional donations
4.11
Custom clearance for interna-
tional donation
4.47 Valuation of the donated
items
4.32
Saying “No” to important
donors for inappropriate dona-
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5.20 Lack of logistics infrastructure
to collect and deliver donated
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to collect and deliver donated
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5.27 Saying “No” to important




3. Ranking of GIK challenges for NGO grouped by the size of their GIK program
( $ value/ year) ( N =34)
Ranking of GIK challenges by
NGOs receiving more than $
100 million GIK / year (N =14)
Mean value
(scale 1 - 6)
Ranking of challenges by
NGOs receiving less than $100
million GIK /year (N=20)
Mean value
(scale 1 - 6)
Getting appropriate products
for programs
2.07 Getting appropriate products
for programs
1.50
Visibility of the donation and
donor reporting
3.57 Valuation of the donated
items
3.50
Transportation and storage in
recipient countries for interna-
tional donations
3.93 Custom clearance for interna-
tional donation
3.80
Custom clearance for interna-
tional donation
4.14 Transportation and storage in
recipient countries for interna-
tional donations
4.10
Saying “No” to important
donors for inappropriate dona-
tions
4.64 Visibility of the donation and
donor reporting
4.30
Lack of logistics infrastructure
to collect and deliver donated
products
4.79 Lack of logistics infrastructure
to collect and deliver donated
products
5.35
Valuation of the donated items 4.86 Saying “No” to important





[1] “Custom report from financial tracking services (fts) database,” tech. rep., UN
Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). http://fts.unocha.
org/ [Online; accessed 20-Jan-2013].
[2] “EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database,” tech. rep.,
Universit Catholique de Louvain, Brussels (Belgium). www.emdat.be [Online;
accessed 24-Nov-2011].
[3] “Neglected tropical diseases overview (children without worms and in-
ternational trachoma initiative).” http://www.taskforce.org/our-work/
projects/neglected-tropical-diseases,[on line, Accessed 06-July-2012].
[4] “The new paradigm: Volunteerism. competence. results..” http://images.
forbes.com/forbesinsights/StudyPDFs/philanthropy_csr_2011.pdf,[on
line, Accessed 22-Jan-2013].
[5] “Partnership to end blinding trachoma through the international trachoma
initiative.” http://www.pfizer.com/responsibility/global_health/
international_trachoma_initiative.jsp,[on line, Accessed 24-July-2012].
[6] “Press release (3/22/2012).” http://www.toysfortots.org/news/details.
asp?nNewsID=50,[on line, Accessed 06-July-2012].
[7] “Salvation army national family stores website.” http://satruck.org/
national-family-stores,[on line, Accessed 06-July-2013].
[8] “Smart media kit.” http://www.smartasn.org/about/SMART_
PressKitOnline.pdf,[on line, Accessed 06-July-2013].
[9] “Steinway v. steinway & sons.” 40 N.Y.S. 718, 17 Misc. 43, 17 Misc. Rep. 43,
1896.





[11] “Food For Peace - 50th Anniversary Booklet,” tech. rep., U.S. Agency




[12] “Determining the Value of Donated Property, (Publication 561),” tech. rep.,
Internal Revenue Services, 2007. http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p561.
pdf [Online; accessed 26 Sep-2013].
[13] “Business’s Social Contract,” tech. rep., Committee Encourag-




[14] “Accord network interagency gift-in-kind standards,” tech. rep., Accord Net-
work, 2009. http://www.accordnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/
04/gik-standards-2009.pdf [Online; accessed 26 Sep2013].
[15] “Charity network inflates efficiency and reduces accountablity,” tech. rep.,
American Institute of Philanthropy, 2009. http://www.charitywatch.org/
articles/DonStewart.html [Online; accessed 24-Nov-2011].
[16] “U.S. International Food Assistance Report (2010),” tech. rep., USAID and
USDA, 2010. http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/Testimony/FY_2010_IFAR_
10-3-11.pdf [Online; accessed 10-Feb-2013].
[17] “Volunteering in the united states - 2010,” Tech. Rep. USDL -11-0084, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, January 2010.
[18] “Annual Report, 2010,” tech. rep., Feeding America, 2011. Pages 2-3,
http://annualreport.feedingamerica.org/misc/FeedingAmerica_2010_
Annual_Report.pdf [Online; accessed 10-Nov-2011].
[19] “GHA Report 2011,” tech. rep., Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2011.
http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/
2011/07/gha-report-2011.pdf [Online; accessed 10-Nov-2011].
[20] “Giving in Numbers, 2012 Edition,” tech. rep., Committee Encouraging Corpo-
rate Philanthropy(CECP), 2011. http://www.corporatephilanthropy.org/
research/benchmarking-reports/giving-in-numbers.html [Online; ac-
cessed 25-Jan-2013].
[21] “Giving USA 2011 - Executive Summary,” tech. rep., Giving USA Foundation,
2011. Page 13, http://www.givingusareports.org/ [Online; accessed 12-Oct-
2011].
[22] “The nonprofit sector in brief - public charities, giving and volunteering, 2011,”
tech. rep., Urban Institute, 2011. http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
412434-NonprofitAlmanacBrief2011.pdf [Online; accessed 11-Oct-2011].




report_2010.pdf [Online; accessed 10-Feb-2012].
[24] “U.S. International Food Assitance Report for Fiscal Year 2012,” tech. rep.,
USAID, 2011. http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/Testimony/FY_2010_IFAR_
10-3-11.pdfl [Online; accessed 21 Sep-2013].
[25] “Volunteering in america 2011 research highlights,” tech. rep., Cor-
poration for National and Community Service, August 2011. url-
http://www.volunteeringinamerica.gov/assets/resources/FactSheetFinal.pdf.
[26] “About Goodwill Industries.” http://www.goodwill.org/wp-content/
uploads/2009/09/About-Goodwill-2012-UPDATED-8-22-12-no-detailed-rev-data.
pdf, 2012. [Online; accessed 1-Feb-2013].
[27] “The business case for product philanthropy,” tech. rep., School of Public and
Envirnmental Affairs, Indiana University, 2012. http://about.good360.org/
productdonationresearch[Online; accessed 05-July-2012].
[28] “The Salvation Army 2011 Financial Report.” http://
salvationarmyannualreport.org/_pdf/2012_Financial.pdf, 2012. [On-
line; accessed 1-Feb-2013].
[29] “2011/2012 Annual Report,” tech. rep., Good360, 2013. http://
about.good360.org/images/pdfs/2011-2012annualreportweb.pdf [Online;
accessed 11-Jun-2013].
[30] “Giving in Numbers, 2013 Edition,” tech. rep., Committee Encouraging
Corporate Philanthropy(CECP), 2013. http://http://cecp.co/research/
benchmarking-reports/giving-in-numbers.html [Online; accessed 21 Sep-
2013].
[31] “TOMS Company Overview,” tech. rep., TOMS, 2013. http://www.toms.com/
corporate-info/l [Online; accessed 10-Aug-2013].
[32] “Program information report ( key data),” tech. rep., Food and Nutrition
Servics, USDA, January, 2012. http://www.fns.usda.gov/fns/key_data/
january-2012.pdf [Online; accessed 21-April-2012].
[33] Abbasi, M.-A., Kumar, S., Andrade Filho, J. A., and Liu, H., “Lessons
learned in using social media for disaster relief-asu crisis response game,” in
Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling and Prediction, pp. 282–289,
Springer, 2012.
[34] Alderson, W., Marketing behavior and executive action: A functionalist
approach to marketing theory. RD Irwin, 1957.
139
[35] Alpizar, F., Carlsson, F., and Johansson-Stenman, O., “Anonymity,
reciprocity, and conformity: Evidence from voluntary contributions to a na-
tional park in costa rica,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 92, no. 5, pp. 1047–
1060, 2008.
[36] Amato, P., “An investigation of planned helping behavior,” Journal of
Research in Personality, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 232–252, 1985.
[37] Amegashie, J., Ouattara, B., and Strobl, E., “Moral hazard and the
composition of transfers: theory with an application to foreign aid,” 2007.
[38] Anderson, E. and Coughlan, A. T., “Channel management: structure,
governance and relationship management,” Handbook of marketing, pp. 223–
247, 2002.
[39] Andreoni, J., “Philanthropy,” Handbook on the Economics of Giving,
Reciprocity and Altruism, vol. 2, pp. 1201–1269, 2006.
[40] Andreoni, J., “Giving with impure altruism : Applications to charity and
ricardian equivalence,” The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 97, no. 6, 1989.
[41] Andreoni, J., “Impure altruism and donations to public goods : A theory of
warm-glow giving,” The Economic Journal, vol. 100, no. 401, 1990.
[42] Andreoni, J. and Petrie, R., “Public goods experiments without confi-
dentiality: a glimpse into fund-raising,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 88,
no. 7-8, 2004.
[43] Anna Breman, O. G. and Masiye, F., “Is foreign aid paternalistic ? (work-
ing paper).” Stockholm School of Economics, 2006.
[44] Arumi, A., Wooden, R., Johnson, J., Farkas, S., Duffett, A., and
Ott, A., “The charitable impulse,” New York: Public Agenda, 2005.
[45] B. Balcik, B. B. e. a., “Coordination in humanitarian relief chains:
Practices, challenges and opportunities,” International Journal of Production
Economics, vol. 126, July 2010.
[46] Barclay, P., “Trustworthiness and competitive altruism can also solve the
tragedy of the commons,” Evolution and Human Behavior, vol. 25, no. 4, 2004.
[47] Barrett, W. P., “Charity Regulators (Finally) Eye Over-





[48] Barrett, W. P., “Donated Pills Make Some Charities




[49] Bateson, M., Nettle, D., and Roberts, G., “Cues of being watched en-
hance cooperation in a real-world setting,” Biology letters, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 412–
414, 2006.
[50] Batson, C. and Shaw, L., “Evidence for altruism: Toward a pluralism of
prosocial motives,” Psychological Inquiry, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 107–122, 1991.
[51] Bekkers, R., “Keeping the faith: Origins of confidence in charitable organi-
zations and its consequences for philanthropy,” in NCVO/VSSN Researching
the Voluntary Sector Conference, pp. 13–14, 2006.
[52] Bekkers, R., “Traditional and health-related philanthropy: The role of re-
sources and personality,” Social Psychology Quarterly, vol. 69, no. 4, pp. 349–
366, 2006.
[53] Bekkers, R. and Crutzen, O., “Just keep it simple: A field experiment on
fundraising letters,” International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector
Marketing, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 371–378, 2007.
[54] Bekkers, R., “It’s not all in the ask. effects and effectiveness of recruitment
strategies used by nonprofits in netherlands.” Paper presented at the 34th An-
nual ARNOVA- Conference, Washington, DC, Novemeber 2005.
[55] Bekkers, R., “When and why matches are more effective subsidies than re-
bates.” Paper presented at the 34th Annual ARNOVA- Conference, Washing-
ton, DC, Novemeber 2005.
[56] Bekkers, R. and Wiepking, P., “A literature review of empirical studies
of philanthropy eight mechanisms that drive charitable giving,” Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 5, pp. 924–973, 2011.
[57] Bennett, R. and Gabriel, H., “Image and reputational characteristics of
uk charitable organizations: An empirical study,” Corporate reputation review,
vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 276–289, 2003.
[58] Bereczkei, T., Birkas, B., and Kerekes, Z., “Public charity offer as a
proximate factor of evolved reputation-building strategy: an experimental anal-
ysis of a real-life situation,” Evolution and Human Behavior, vol. 28, no. 4,
pp. 277–284, 2007.
[59] Besley, T., “A simple model for merit good arguments,” Journal of Public
economics, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 371–383, 1988.
141
[60] Bhattacharya, C., Sen, S., and Korschun, D., “Win the war for talent,”
MIT Sloan Management Review, vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 37–44, 2008.
[61] Binder, A. and Witte, J., “Business engagement in humanitarian relief: key
trends and policy implications, a background paper by the humanitarian policy
group of the overseas development institute (odi),” 2007.
[62] Bloomberg Businessweek, “Corporate Philanthropy’s Biggest Givers
.” http://www.businessweek.com/interactive\_reports/philanthropy\
_corporate.html, 2007. [Online; accessed 24-Nov-2011].
[63] Brammer, S. and Millington, A., “Corporate reputation and philanthropy:
An empirical analysis,” Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 29–44,
2005.
[64] Brooks, A. C., “Do government subsidies to nonprofits crowd out donations
or donors?,” Public Finance Review, vol. 31, no. 2, 2003.
[65] Brown, E. and Lankford, H., “Gifts of money and gifts of time estimat-
ing the effects of tax prices and available time,” Journal of Public Economics,
vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 321–341, 1992.
[66] Bruntland, G. and others, “Our common future: The world commission
on environment and development,” 1987.
[67] Bryant, W. K., Jeon-Slaughter, H., Hyojin, K., and Tax, A., “Par-
ticipation in philanthropic activities: Donating money and time.,” Journal of
Consumer Policy, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 43 – 73, 2003.
[68] Callen, J., “Money donations, volunteering and organizational efficiency,”
Journal of Productivity Analysis, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 215–228, 1994.
[69] Cappellari, L., Ghinetti, P., and Turati, G., “On time and money do-
nations,” Journal of Socio-Economics, vol. 40, no. 6, pp. 853–867, 2011.
[70] Carpenter, J. and Myers, C., “Why volunteer? evidence on the role of
altruism, image, and incentives,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 94, no. 11,
pp. 911–920, 2010.
[71] Carroll, A., “A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate perfor-
mance,” Academy of management review, pp. 497–505, 1979.
[72] Carroll, A., “The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: toward the
moral management of organizational stakeholders,” Business horizons, vol. 34,
no. 4, pp. 39–48, 1991.
[73] Charles, A., Lauras, M., and Van Wassenhove, L., “A model to define
and assess the agility of supply chains: building on humanitarian experience,”
International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, vol. 40,
no. 8/9, pp. 722–741, 2010.
142
[74] Cheung, C.-K. and Chan, C.-M., “Social-cognitive factors of donating
money to charity, with special attention to an international relief organization,”
Evaluation and Program Planning, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 241 – 253, 2000.
[75] Chomilier, B., Samii, R., and Van Wassenhove, L. N., “The central role
of supply chain management at ifrc,” Forced Migration Review, vol. 18, no. 2,
pp. 15–16, 2003.
[76] Clark, J., “Recognizing large donations to public goods: an experimental
test,” Managerial and Decision Economics, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 33–44, 2002.
[77] Clarkson, M., “A stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating cor-
porate social performance.,” Academy of management review, vol. 20, no. 1,
pp. 92–117, 1995.
[78] Clary, E., Snyder, M., Ridge, R., Copeland, J., Stukas, A., Haugen,
J., and Miene, P., “Understanding and assessing the motivations of volunteers:
a functional approach.,” Journal of personality and social psychology, vol. 74,
no. 6, p. 1516, 1998.
[79] Cnaan, R. A. and Goldberg-Glen, R. S., “Measuring motivation to vol-
unteer in human services,” The Journal of applied behavioral science, vol. 27,
no. 3, pp. 269–284, 1991.
[80] Currie, J. and Gahvari, F., “Transfers in cash and in-kind: Theory meets
the data,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 46, no. 2, 2008.
[81] Daly, G. and Giertz, F., “Welfare economics and welfare reform,” The
American Economic Review, vol. 62, no. 1/2, pp. 131–138, 1972.
[82] Daniel, L., “Southcom completes haiti disaster response.” http://www.
defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=59423, 2010. [Online; accessed 24-
Nov-2011].
[83] Daponte, B. and Bade, S., “How the private food assistance network evolved:
Interactions between public and private responses to hunger,” Nonprofit and
voluntary sector quarterly, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 668–690, 2006.
[84] David J Burns, Jane S. Reid, M. T. J. F. and Anderson, C., “Motiva-
tions to volunteer : The role of altruism,” International Review of Public and
Non Profit Marketing, vol. 3, no. 2, 2006.
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